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THREE ESSAYS ON AUCTIONS
Zhiyong Tu, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2005
This dissertation studies new bidding behaviors in richer environments where bidders
can either communicate or intertemporally interact. We focus on such three perspectives
as collusion, strategic information disclosure and intertemporal inference. In the collusion
chapter, we propose a framework to investigate the structure of endogenous collusion and
show that an endogenously formed ring shall in general be a partial ring. In the information
disclosure chapter, we study the auctioneer’s optimal choice of interperiod information release
and show the standard sequential Dutch auction or the sequential first-price auction with
the announcement of each stage’s winning bid can generate the highest revenue among all
considered sequential auction formats. In the intertemporal inference chapter, we suggest a
resale explanation for the price path in sequential auctions with multi-unit demand.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Traditional auction models generally treat auctions in a static environment where there exists
neither communication nor intertemporal interaction among bidders. But in many realistic
situations, auctions are run in multiple rounds. Bidders can not only communicate, but also
obtain rivals’ private information though interperiod inference. In such richer situations,
whether bidders will display certain new behaviors is the question that this dissertation is
going to focus on.
The following three chapters will study auctions from the perspectives of collusion, strate-
gic information disclosure and intertemporal inference respectively. In Chapter 2, we endoge-
nize collusion by allowing a collusion initiator to select a particular scheme and then propose
it to a chosen number of other bidders. The main finding is that, when there are at least
three bidders, an endogenously formed ring includes at least two members and is in general
not all-inclusive. Since a partial ring creates bidder asymmetry, it makes a first-price auction
inefficient. This finding provides a basis for laws that outlaw collusion in auctions. Chapter
3 characterizes equilibria in various two-stage sequential auction formats under all possible
forms of interperiod information disclosure in an IPV model. We study the role of interpe-
riod information disclosure in affecting bidders’ intertemporal learning, bidding, and auction
revenue. Unlike Milgrom and Weber (1982), who show in their model that it is always good
for the auctioneer to commit to complete information revelation, we find that this is not
necessarily the case in sequential auctions due to bidders’ intertemporal substitution. In our
model, only selective information release can be revenue enhancing. We show that the stan-
dard sequential Dutch auction or the sequential first-price auction with the announcement of
each stage’s winning bid generates the highest revenue among all considered auction formats.
Chapter 4 studies price trends in a sequential first-price common-value auction with resale.
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It differs from the previous research in that it considers sequential auctions with multi-unit
demand. In the two-stage case, we propose a condition that guarantees the existence of a
symmetric monotonic equilibrium which exhibits a declining trend. This is because bidders
have the incentive to overbid in the first round to lower their rivals’ intertemporal inference
on the object value so that they can obtain a second-stage advantage. We also characterize
the necessary properties of symmetric monotonic equilibria in the finite N-stage and the
infinite-stage cases. In the former case, the price trend remains constant and drops only at
the last stage; in the latter case, we have a constant price trend throughout. In the final
chapter, we summarize the new results that this dissertation obtains and lay out the future
research agenda.
2
2.0 ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF A BIDDING RING
Auctions are a prevalent mechanism to allocate resources. It is natural for bidders to collude
in order to capture the surplus that should have been transferred to the auctioneer. The
format of collusion in auctions has been widely studied and the current literature follows two
major trends. The first trend applies a mechanism design approach to study different forms
of collusion in a one-shot auction game. Recent papers include McAfee and McMillan (1992),
Marshall, Meurer, Richard and Stromquist (1994), and Marshall and Marx (2004). The other
trend explores the implicit collusion of bidders in a repeated game framework. Recent works
include Blume and Heidhues (2002), Aoyagi (2003) and Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004).
The auction literature on collusion is also related to the industrial organization literature on
cartel and merger, such as Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), Deneckere and Davidson
(1985), Cave and Salant (1995); and to the game theory literature on coalition formation
such as Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999). In this paper, we will adopt the mechanism
design approach to study the endogenous formation of a bidding ring in a one-shot first-price
auction. Related works are briefly discussed as follows.
McAfee and McMillan (1992) analyze collusion in the first-price auction within a homo-
geneous Independent Private Value (IPV) framework (we will refer to their paper as MM
(1992) hereafter). Their emphasis is on a surplus division game for an all-inclusive cartel.
They show that collusion is inefficient when the cartel is weak (no internal transfer) and
efficient when the cartel is strong (side payments allowed). An incomplete cartel is also
studied for a discrete special case where bidders’ valuations follow a two-point distribution.
In this special case, they analyze a cartel formation game, which suggests a way to model
the ring formation when bidders can make endogenous decisions. The major problem with
this approach, however, is that in general it may not yield a unique equilibrium outcome,
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i.e., there may be more than one coalition structure that satisfies the stipulated equilibrium
conditions. This point can be supported by a similar numerical example in Deneckere and
Davidson (1985) where merger with Bertrand competition is studied and we see that almost
all coalition sizes can satisfy the MM (1992) equilibrium conditions. Another problem of this
approach is concerned with one equilibrium condition, which requires that being an outsider
captures at least as big surplus as joining the ring. This condition aims to prevent the devi-
ation of the outsiders. But a successful deviation of an outsider not only hinges on her own
payoff comparison, but also on whether the ring will want to accept her. Even if the outsider
finds it profitable to join the ring, once her joining decreases the ring members’ surplus, the
ring may not accept her. Therefore, the above equilibrium condition is too strong for the
purpose of preventing an outsider’s deviation. Even if the condition is not satisfied, once a
ring finds it unprofitable to accept an outsider, an equilibrium will emerge.
The incomplete cartel problem in MM (1992) is not fully tackled because the bidders
become asymmetric under collusion in the first-price auction, which makes the equilibrium
bid functions analytically unsolvable. Marshall, Meurer, Richard and Stromquist (1994)
approach this analytical difficulty with numerical methods. They provide numerical results
for a K-member ring of N bidders (K ≤ N) in a homogeneous IPV setting where bidders’
valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution over the support of [0, 1]. The results
reported in their paper give us a good understanding as to how the surplus of ring members
and outsiders evolves when the ring size increases.
Bidder collusion in a heterogeneous IPV environment is studied in Marshall and Marx
(2004). They divide collusive mechanisms into two categories, the bid coordination mecha-
nism and the bid submission mechanism and carry out a characterization of collusive behavior
in the first and second-price auctions under each. One important feature of their collusive
scheme is that once a ring member deviates, the ring does not operate and all bidders bid
non-cooperatively. As they mention in their paper, this is a common, but not innocent as-
sumption. In fact, the collapse of the ring as one member defects is not a credible threat if it
is in the remaining members’ own interests to continue the collusive operation. A more com-
mon equilibrium condition adopted in the coalition formation literature is that the coalition
will still operate but with one member fewer, like in MM (1992), Bloch (1996) and Ray and
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Vohra (1999). Also, the ring setup is exogenously given and the endogenous ring formation
problem is not dealt with.
In the IO literature, Cave and Salant (1995) propose a majority-rule voting game to
endogenize the decision of cartel structure. Notice that an important variable, the cartel size
is exogenously given as all-inclusive. It is not obvious how a cartel size can be endogenized
under a voting setup. Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) study endogenous coalition
formation via a sequential bargaining game. Their methods however, are hardly tractable if
applied to the standard auction setup.
Our objective in this paper is thus to propose a tractable approach to analyze bidders’
collusive behavior in an environment where they can endogenously choose and implement
a mechanism for themselves. A sketch of the approach is that nature selects a collusion
initiator from N symmetric bidders. This initiator then proposes a collusive scheme that
maximizes her own ex ante surplus to a chosen number of other bidders. If these invited
bidders agree to join the ring, then collusion works according to the proposed scheme. If an
invited bidder declines the proposal, she will bid non-cooperatively along with the uninvited
bidders. Detailed description of the whole game and related discussions will be left for the
next section.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a tractable framework to model en-
dogenous ring formation in auctions. Within this framework, we find that when there are
at least three bidders, an endogenously formed ring includes at least two members and is in
general not all-inclusive. As the first-price auction becomes asymmetric after the collusion,
the auction outcome will be inefficient. An implication is that outlawing the collusion will be
socially beneficial. The approach in this paper can be readily extended to the other auction
formats.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we set up the auction
environment and define the collusive scheme. Section 3 formulates the endogenous collusive
problem that bidders need to solve. Section 4 gives the solution and Section 5 concludes.
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2.1 AUCTION SETTING AND COLLUSIVE SCHEME
This is an N -bidder single object first-price auction model ( N > 1) with no reserve price.1
All bidders are risk-neutral and their private valuations, v1,v2,...vN , are independent random
variables with the same density f(vi) on the common support [v, v]. f(vi) is continuously
differentiable and bounded away from zero on [v, v].
The endogenous ring formation game consists of the following four stages.
Stage 1. Nature selects a bidder to be the collusion initiator with probability
1
N
from N
symmetric bidders.
Stage 2. Before all bidders (including the collusion initiator) observe their private valuations,
the collusion initiator selects a collusive scheme Γ, which contains a bid assignment rule and
a transfer rule, from the feasible set of schemes defined below. To a chosen number of other
bidders, she announces the collusive rules.
Stage 3. After considering the above proposal, each invited bidder decides whether to join
the ring or not. If an invited bidder agrees to join, she will commit to the scheme proposed by
the collusion initiator. If an invited bidder refuses to join, she will then bid non-cooperatively
along with the uninvited bidders in the main auction.
Stage 4. All bidders observe their private valuations and bid according to their plans decided
in stage 3.
We will address four points concerning the above collusion game. First, in the first stage,
since bidders are ex ante identical, each bidder will have an equal chance to be chosen by
nature as the collusion initiator, hence the selection probability is
1
N
. Second, in stage 3, we
assume that once an invited bidder turns down the proposal, she will bid non-cooperatively.
This means we assume only the collusion initiator has the ability to organize a ring. This
is the major simplifying assumption that makes our future analysis tractable. Finally, we
assume both the collusive proposal and the decisions to accept or decline the proposal must
be made before all bidders observe their valuations. This assumption fits into the circum-
stances where bidders will have to collude before they know exactly the object value. These
1A reserve price complicates our derivation, but does not affect our basic conclusions. We do not analyze
its effect in this paper.
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circumstances arise when bidders find that as the precise information on the object value
has been collected, it may be too late to organize a ring.
Now we will define the feasible set of schemes, from which the collusion initiator will
select one. A collusive scheme is a mechanism denoted by Γ = (K, βK , TK). K is the
number of bidders that are included in a ring. βK : [v, v]
K → RK , is the function that maps
from all members’ reports to their respectively assigned bids given the ring size is K. Let
V = (v1, v2, ...vK), which denotes the vector of K ring members’ valuations. We use βˆK (V )
to denote the largest bid that βK (V ) assigns given the report vector V . So βˆK (V ) is a
mapping from [v, v]K to R. TK : [v, v]
K → RK , is the payment function based on all ring
members’ reports. We impose only one restriction on the mechanism. The payment rule
TK (V ) can be decomposed into two parts: PK (V ) and XK , where PK (V ) is a function from
[v, v]K to R and XK is a scalar, for any given K. Only the member whose assigned bid is the
highest according to βK (V ) pays the amount PK (V ) to the Center. All members obtain an
equal non-contingent transfer XK from the Center. So we are employing an equal surplus
sharing rule.
2.2 FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
2.2.1 Optimality Criterion
Without loss of generality, we make bidder 1 the collusion initiator. So Bidder 1 will choose
the appropriate K, βK (V ), PK (V ) and XK to maximize her own ex ante payoff defined
as G1K , where the subscript K denotes the number of ring members. Then G
1
K equals the
following expression:
1
K
{XK+Ev1...vK [(v1−βˆK(V )) Pr(bidder 1 wins the object|bidder 1 is assigned the largest bid
by βK(V )) −Ev1...vK [ PK (V )|bidder 1 is assigned the largest bid by βK(V )]} +
K − 1
K
×XK
1
K
is the probability that bidder 1 is assigned the highest bid by the bid assignment rule
βK(V ), given that ring members’ signals are iid.
K − 1
K
is the probability that her assigned
bid is not the highest. XK is the non-contingent transfer. The term Ev1...vK [ PK (V )|bidder
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1 is assigned the largest bid by βK(V )] is the expected payment conditional on that the
bidder’s assigned bid is the highest among all members. The expression:
Ev1...vK [(v1 − βˆK(V )) Pr(bidder 1 wins the object|bidder 1 is assigned the largest bid by
βK(V ))] is the expected surplus captured from the main auction conditional on bidder 1 has
the highest assigned bid.
Notice that G1K can also be rearranged as:
1
K
Ev1...vK [(v1 − βˆK(V )) Pr(bidder 1 wins the object|bidder 1 is assigned the largest bid by
βK(V ))]− 1
K
Ev1...vK [ PK (V )|bidder 1 is assigned the largest bid by βˆK(V )] +XK
It is easy to see that the ex ante expected surplus for the other ring members has the
same expression as G1K because a) they have iid signals and b) the collusive proposal adopts
an equal surplus sharing rule. Both of these factors help to preserve the symmetry of ring
members.
2.2.2 Constraints
In order to make the mechanism implementable, the collusion initiator’s optimization prob-
lem will have to be subject to the following four regular constraints: budget balance, the
incentive compatibility for reports, incentive compatibility for bidding and the participation
constraint.
2.2.2.1 Budget Balance It is a standard requirement that the mechanism should be ex
ante budget-balanced. Based on the mechanism’s equal surplus sharing rule, we need that
XK =
1
K
Ev1...vK [ PK (V )]. An immediate consequence of this budget balance constraint is
that G1K collapses to:
1
K
Ev1...vK [(v1 − βˆK(V )) Pr(bidder 1 wins the object|bidder 1 is assigned the largest bid by
βK(V ))]. This is because Ev1...vK [ PK (V )] = Ev1...vK [ PK (V )|bidder 1 is assigned the largest
bid by βK(V )].
2
2Ev1...vK [PK (V )] =
∑K
i=1 Pr (bidder i is assigned the largest bid by βK (V ))×Ev1...vK [PK (V ) |bidder i is
assigned the largest bid by βK (V )]. As both Pr (bidder i is assigned the largest bid by βK (V ))) and
Ev1...vK [PK (V ) |bidder i is assigned the largest bid by βK (V )] are the same for all i because of the bidder
symmetry, we then have Ev1...vK [PK (V )] = Ev1...vK [PK (V ) | bidder i is assigned the largest bid by βK (V )]
for all i.
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Notice that the term:
Ev1...vK [(v1 − βˆK(V )) Pr(bidder 1 wins the object|bidder 1 is assigned the largest bid
by βK(V ))] is the total surplus captured by the ring, so G
1
K also becomes the per member
surplus of the ring. Because of the bidder symmetry, maximizing the collusion initiator’s
own surplus now is equivalent to maximizing the per member surplus of the ring. Define
the per member surplus as GK , so GK =
1
K
Ev1...vK [(v− βˆK(V )) Pr( βˆK(V )wins the object)],
where v is defined as the report in V that is assigned the largest bid by βK(V ).
The following lemma shows an important property of the optimal collusive mechanism.
Lemma 1 Under the defined collusive scheme, the optimal βK(V ) always assigns the largest
bid βˆK(V ) to the member with the highest report and βˆK(V ) only needs to condition on the
highest report v.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 tells us that there is no contradiction between optimality and efficiency inside
the ring. For any given ring size K, each ring member’s surplus will be maximized if the
member with the highest object value is assigned the largest bid to compete in the main
auction. Also, the optimal bid assigned to the highest-report member does not need to
condition on other members’ reports. This lemma largely simplifies our future analysis. The
intuition is that the highest-report member could capture more surplus for her own hence
have more surplus to share with all the other members. Since now the whole ring would
equally share the surplus captured only by the highest-report member, other members’
reports are then extraneous information in term of the ring’s surplus maximization. With
this lemma, the per member surplus GK becomes:
1
K
Ev1...vK [(v − βˆK(v)) Pr( βˆK(v)wins the object)|v is the highest report in V ].
Another consequence from the budget balance constraint is that the payment rule PK (V )
and XK disappear from GK explicitly. It means that the payment rule will not be an element
that can affect ring members’ surplus. So the ring’s surplus will now only depend on {K,
βˆK (v)}. An implication is that various payment rules, as long as they satisfy the equal
surplus sharing and budget balance assumptions, can all be used to implement the efficient
mechanism here. For example, the first-price pre auction knockout used in MM (1992) can
be readily generalized to implement efficient collusion for any given ring size K. The second-
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price pre auction knockout in Marshall and Marx (2004) is also an effective implementation
method. It does not matter which knockout the ring chooses: it will not affect any member’s
ex ante expected surplus. This fact is summarized as the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Under the defined collusive schemes, different constructions of payment rule will
not affect the optimal collusive surplus.
Actually, the irrelevance of the payment rule to the collusive surplus can also be obtained
from the incentive comparability for reports constraint. It is easy to check that the commonly
known property in mechanism design that only the allocation rule affects the equilibrium
payoff can be applied here to produce Lemma 2. But the incentive compatibility for reports
constraint alone can not lead to the result stated in Lemma 1.
2.2.2.2 Incentive Compatibility for Bidding In order to maximize the per capita
surplus GK , we necessarily require that for any ring size K, the corresponding total ring
surplus must be maximized. As the ring can not endogenously choose the main auction rule,
it can only design an appropriate βˆK(v) to bring maximum total surplus to itself given the
outside bidders’ strategies. This leads to the following incentive compatibility for bidding
condition:
(I) βˆK(v) ∈ argmax
b
(v − b)× Pr[b ≥ maxj∈{K+1,...N} βoutK (vj)]
(II) βoutK (vj) ∈ argmax
b
(vj − b)× Pr{b ≥ max[maxj′∈{K+1,...N}\{j} βoutK (vj′ ), βˆK(v)]}
βoutK (vj) denotes the bid function for any outsider j, who competes against a ring of
size K. Since the outsiders are ex ante identical, they will follow the same equilibrium bid
function βoutK (.). Therefore, (I) and (II) simultaneously determine the collusive scheme’s
optimal bid assignment rule βˆK(v) and the outsiders’ bid function β
out
K (.) as a pair of mutual
best responses.
2.2.2.3 Participation Constraint Finally, we come to the participation constraint,
which aims to ensure the stability of the proposed scheme. In our setup, the stability condi-
tion only needs to make sure that joining the ring is better than bidding non-cooperatively.
Marshall and Marx (2004) adopt a strong punishment to the deviant by collapsing the whole
ring. In this paper, we assume that when a single member deviates, the ring can still operate
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but with one member fewer. The punishment here is much weaker, and due to a free-rider
effect, an outsider may capture more surplus than a ring member. A similar effect is re-
ported in IO literature such as Salant et al (1983) and Deneckere and Davidson (1985), who
study merger under Cournot and Bertrand competition respectively. Both papers find that
outside firms can capture more surplus than coalition members by free riding on the overall
suppressed competition. The free-rider effect from collusion in auctions can also be seen in
the numerical results in Marshall et al (1994). In a similar collusive scheme with iid uniform
valuations, they show that as the ring size increases, the outsiders’ surplus also increases.
So the collusive benefit of the ring leaks out to the outsiders too. Can the free-rider effect
be so big as to disable a ring? They do not provide a numerical example in which this is the
case. But later in this paper, we will show analytically that this is a possibility.
Before we write down the specific participation constraint, let us introduce some notation.
We use DK to denote the ex ante expected deviation profit for a single member i in a ring of
size K. Since all members are ex ante identical, their deviation profits will be the same. We
will use v′ to denote the valuation of the deviating member and v(K−1)1 to denote the highest
order statistic among the valuations of the K − 1 remaining members. Then
DK = Ev′{(v′−βoutK−1(v′))×Pr[βoutK−1(v′) ≥ max[maxj∈{K+1,...N} βoutK−1(vj), βˆK−1(v(K−1)1 )]]}. So
the participation constraint will be: GK ≥ DK , i.e., a ring member should obtain equal or
more surplus as she stays in a ring than when she becomes a outsider. Once this constraint
is satisfied, in equilibrium all invited bidders will accept the collusion initiator’s proposal
since it is not profitable for them to reject.
2.2.3 Optimization Problem
The collusion initiator’s problem has now been largely simplified. The budget balance con-
straint narrows our search for the optimal mechanism to those efficient ones. The incentive
compatibility for bidding constraint in fact pins down the bid assignment rule. Therefore,
the number of ring members K remains as the only choice variable to maximize the ex ante
per member surplus GK subject to the participation constraint. Hence, an initially compli-
cated endogenous ring formation problem now boils down to an optimal ring size problem.
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Let us use βinK (v) to denote the ring’s bid assignment rule βˆK(v) so that the notation β
in
K (v)
can more clearly represent the ring’s bid in counter to the outsider’s bid βoutK (v) in our sub-
sequent analysis. Formally, this optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
max
K∈{1,2,..N}
GK
subject to:
βinK (v) ∈ argmax
b
(v − b)× Pr[b ≥ maxj∈{K+1,...N} βoutK (vj)]
βoutK (vj) ∈ argmax
b
(vj − b)× Pr{b ≥ max[maxj′∈{K+1,...N}\{j} βoutK (vj′ ), βinK (v)]}
GK ≥ DK
where v is the highest order statistic in the K-dimensional vector of reports V and vj is the
valuation of the outsider j.
2.3 SOLUTION
Although the endogenous ring formation problem has been much simplified, a complete
solution to it is still analytically impossible. The major difficulty is that the above incentive
compatibility for bidding constraint can not yield a pair of closed form equilibrium bid
functions. Nevertheless, our assumption that f(vi) is continuously differentiable and bounded
away from zero on the common support [v, v] will guarantee the existence and uniqueness
of a monotonically increasing pure strategy equilibrium βinK (v) and β
out
K (vj) for any given
ring size K.3 Therefore, for a given density, the above formulation can lead to a numerical
solution to the optimal ring size, hence an endogenous collusion format. This paper will only
deal with the analytical solutions, which will also bring us several important results. We will
proceed by first characterizing some properties of the equilibrium bid functions.
2.3.1 Characterization of the Bid Functions
As before, βinK (v) denotes the equilibrium bid function of the ring and β
out
K (vj) denotes the
equilibrium bid function for the outside bidder j. Let λinK (β) and λ
out
K (β) denote the inverse
3 See the existence and uniqueness results in Maskin and Riley (2000b), (2003), Athey (2001) and Lebrun
(2002) etc.
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bid functions for βinK (v) and β
out
K (v) respectively. F˜ denotes the c.d.f of the highest order
statistic v of v1, ...vK . Then using the monotonicity of λ
in
K (β) and λ
out
K (β), β
in
K (v) and β
out
K (vj)
must satisfy:
(I ′) βinK (v) = argmax
b
{(v − b)×[F (λoutK (b))]N−K}
(II ′) βout(vj) = argmax
b
{(vj − b)× F˜ [λinK (b)]× [F (λoutK (b))]N−K−1}
The first-order conditions derived from (I ′) and (II ′) will establish a system of differential
equations, from which the following properties of bid functions can be easily obtained.
Lemma 3 Properties of the equilibrium bid functions:
(a) βinK (v) = β
out
K (v)=v, β
in
K (v) = β
out
K (v) = β
∗
K.
(b) βinK (v) < β
out
K (v) for all v ∈ (v, v).
(c)
dβinK (v)
dv
|v=v = 1− 1
N −K + 1 ,
dβoutK (v)
dv
|v=v = 1− 1
N
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Property (a) is standard, which says that both bid functions have the same starting
and ending points for any given ring size K. Property (b) shows that the outsiders always
bid more aggressively than the ring for all v ∈ (v, v). Again, it is the standard weakness
leading to aggression result. Property (c) deals with the motion of bids at the lower support.
Marshall et al (1994) derive the same derivative results for the uniform distribution when
they pursue a numerical solution. Here, we find that these derivative results actually hold for
any density. All these properties will be useful for our future characterization of the optimal
ring size.
2.3.2 Unconstrained Optimal Ring Size
The following proposition is the only analytical result on the optimal ring size that we can
obtain for the general density of bidders’ valuations. That is, if we ignore the participation
constraint, the all-inclusive ring will maximize each member’s expected surplus. We follow
the common assumption that an all-inclusive ring wins the object with zero cost, which
enables the ring to capture the whole surplus in the auction. But as the surplus has to be
spread to all members, we can not immediately tell whether the per member surplus is also
13
maximized. The following proposition gives us an affirmative answer.4
Proposition 1 Under the defined collusive schemes, the all-inclusive ring maximizes the
ex ante per member surplus once the participation constraint is ignored.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Does the above proposition still hold once some participation constraint is imposed?
Under the participation constraint assumption in Marshall and Marx (2004), i.e., a ring
collapses when a single member deviates, an all-inclusive ring can definitely prevent any
deviation, hence will be the optimal ring size.5 However, we rarely if ever to observe an
all-inclusive ring in practice especially when the number of bidders is large. As we argued
before, the participation constraint adopted in this paper gives rise to a free-rider effect
for outsiders. If the suppressed competition resulting from the collusion of large number of
bidders creates a big free-rider effect, the all-inclusive ring may be very hard to sustain. Then
a non all-inclusive ring will be justified as the endogenous collusion format in equilibrium.
Because of the analytical difficulties, this result will be shown in the following section only
for the uniform distribution.
2.3.3 Constrained Optimal Ring Size
The task in this section is to show that in order to guarantee the stability of the ring, the
collusion initiator may only approach a fraction of all the bidders before she announces the
collusion idea. So a non all-inclusive ring can be rationalized as bidders’ endogenous optimal
choice.
We assume now that bidders’ valuations are iid uniform over the support [0, v¯]. So the
density function is f (v) =
1
v
and the c.d.f is F (v) =
v
v
. Besides those properties of the bid
functions in Lemma 3, we will derive some additional ones for this particular density. Let
βinN−1(v) denote the equilibrium bid functions for the ring of size N − 1, and βoutN−1(v) the
bid function for the only outsider. λinN−1(β) and λ
out
N−1 (β) denote their inverse functions
4Notice that the all-inclusive ring maximizes the per member surplus even with a posted reserve price.
5The per member surplus of the all-inclusive ring is
1
N
∫ v
v
[v−v]d[F (v)]N , which is bigger than the surplus
from noncooperative bidding
1
N
∫ v
v
[v − β (v)]d[F (v)]N , where β (v) is the equilibrium bid function.
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respectively. β∗ denotes the common terminal bid at the valuation v. Then we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 4 When bidders’ valuations are iid uniform over the support [0, v], the equilibrium
bid functions βinN−1(v) and β
out
N−1(v) have the following properties:
(a) βoutN−1(v) and β
in
N−1(v) are concave and convex respectively.
(b) λinN−1(β) >
v
β∗
β for all β ∈ [0, β∗].
(c) β∗ = v
(
1− C 1N−2
)
where C =
NN
22N−2(N − 1)N−1 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Property (a) in the above lemma shows that both bid functions behave regularly. Prop-
erty (b) is an immediate consequence of (a), which says that λinN−1(β) , the inverse bid
function of the ring, must lie above the line joining the origin and the common terminal
bid β∗ at the valuation v. Property (c) gives an analytical expression for the terminal bid
β∗, which can be shown to increase with the number of bidders. With these properties,
Proposition 6 gives us a sufficient condition under which a non all-inclusive ring will be the
endogenous collusive scheme.
Proposition 2 If bidders’ valuations are iid uniform over the support [0, v], a non all-
inclusive ring will be the endogenous collusive scheme when the total number of bidders is
bigger or equal to 10.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Unfortunately, we can not solve analytically for the constrained optimal ring size for an
arbitrarily given total number of bidders N . But we can be sure that it is definitely not the
degenerate single-bidder ring. This assertion is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If bidders’ valuations are iid uniform over the support [0, v], any ring with
at least two members can always capture more per member surplus than the noncooperative
bidding.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Therefore in the first-price auction a ring is very likely to exist since we show that
endogenous collusion should include at least two members. At the same time, the collusion is
generally not all-inclusive, especially when the number of bidders participating in the auction
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is large. So our conclusion is that bidders tend to form a nontrivial ring (ring size belongs
to {2, .., N − 1} when N > 2) endogenously. This gives rise to two important implications.
First, in MM (1992) the overall auction outcome is efficient under a strong cartel, which
consists of all bidders. In contrast, we show here that once the collusion is endogenized, a
nontrivial ring will be formed and it will create bidder asymmetry and consequently lead to
inefficient outcome in the main auction. Therefore, it will be socially beneficial to outlaw
collusion in auctions. The associated policy implication is that more resources need to be
devoted to the enforcement of anti-collusion laws. Second, the nontrivial ring result heavily
hinges on the free-rider effect in the first-price auction. Such an effect disappears in the
second-price auction, which means that an all-inclusive ring might be more common there.
2.4 CONCLUSION
This paper studies how collusion emerges in a first-price auction. We endogenize collusion
by allowing a collusion initiator to select a particular scheme and then propose it to a chosen
number of other bidders. The main finding is that, when there are at least three bidders, an
endogenously formed ring includes at least two members and is in general not all-inclusive.
Since a partial ring creates bidder asymmetry, it makes a first-price auction inefficient. This
finding provides a basis for laws that outlaw collusion in auctions.
This paper is only a first step to delve into the endogenous collusion problem in auctions.
There are still many open questions left for future research. For example, we could consider
cases where bidders are ex ante heterogeneous; where there is more than one collusion ini-
tiator among bidders leading to multiple rings in the auction; and other possible relaxations
of those assumptions defining the bidders’ collusive technology. With these extensions, we
might discover more intriguing or profitable forms of collusion.
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3.0 INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Many nondurable goods auctions are carried out repeatedly across periods, such as flower
auctions and fish auctions, etc. It is interesting to observe that these goods are often sold via
the Dutch auction format or its variants. The sale of flowers is a well known example for its
use of the Dutch auction (about 85% of Netherlands cut flowers are handled by the Dutch
auctions annually1). The fish auction is a natural variant of the Dutch format. Here then
comes the puzzle. In the auction literature, we know that if bidder are risk-neutral and their
valuations are independent and identically distributed, the first-price, second-price, Dutch
and English auctions are revenue equivalent; and once their valuations are affiliated, the
English auction generates the highest revenue followed by the second-price auction and then
the Dutch and first-price auctions. In both cases, the Dutch auction never beats the other
auction procedures in term of revenue. But why do people stick to it in various nondurable
goods auctions? In this paper, we provide one explanation, that is, the Dutch auction can
be revenue superior in a sequential environment that captures the essential features of the
nondurable goods sale.2
There are four important features for most nondurable goods auctions. First, those
goods are sold period by period because they are nondurable and the goods sold each period
are approximately the same. Second, bidders’ identities are the same across periods, and
these bidders tend to be large buyers in the same line of business aiming for the retail
1The figure is quoted from the International Labor Organization working paper The World Cut Flower
Industry: Trends and Prospects.
2Notice that in practice flowers are sold repeatedly via a kind of multi-unit Dutch auction. Because of
the analytical difficulties, this paper only models the sequential single-unit auction.
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resale of the auctioning goods. Third, because of the similarity of each period’s goods, the
valuations of the same bidder in two consecutive rounds tend to be correlated. Finally, due
to this valuation correlation and constant bidder identity, each bidder can always infer some
information on her rivals’ current valuations from the released bidding results of previous
rounds. This interperiod learning makes bidding behavior very different from that in a
one-shot auction.
In this paper, we analyze the sequential sale via a highly stylized independent private
value (IPV) model, where two bidders compete for two identical nondurable objects, each
per period. In connection with the flower sale, the private value can be interpreted as the
private gross profit (before deducting the bid) of each buyer in the industry. Then the goal
of the auctioneer is to select an auction format with appropriate interperiod information
release to maximize her overall revenue. We assume that the auctioneer will commit to one
auction format for both periods. The commonly adopted formats include: the first-price and
second-price auctions, the English and Dutch auctions. The choices of information disclosure
at the end of each stage auction include: announcing winning or losing status, winning or
losing bids or both.3 This in turn defines 16 sequential auction formats, most of which are
outcome equivalent as we will discuss later. The objective of this paper is to characterize the
Perfect Baysian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) in various sequential auction formats and then
carry out the revenue comparison to find out the optimal one.
The distinction of this paper from other works on sequential auctions is briefly summa-
rized as follows. It differs from McAfee and Vincent (1997) in the following respect. McAfee
and Vincent (1997) deal with the sale of a single object, which will be resold if it can not be
auctioned when all bids in a given period are below the reserve price. This paper, however,
studies the sequential sale of two objects, each of which can always be auctioned at each
period since we will assume no reserve price. The difference between this paper and Weber
(1983) is that Weber considers a sequential auction with unit-demand and a bidder quits the
auction once she obtains one unit, while this paper studies a sequential sale where a bidder
pursues a unit every period.
3Notice that the minimum information released in each period is the winning or losing status because
bidders need to know their entitlement to the object, which is nondurable hence must be consumed in the
current period.
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There are three contributions in this paper. First, we characterize the equilibria in
various two-stage sequential auctions with multi-unit demand. Second, we analyze the effect
of interperiod information release on bidding behavior and the revenue. Finally, from the
revenue comparison of all sequential formats, we obtain the result that the standard Dutch
auction is tied with the first-price auction with the winning-bid announcement, generating
the highest revenue. Considering the implementation simplicity of the standard Dutch format
relative to its first-price counterpart, this result may explain the pervasive employment of
Dutch auctions in flowers and fish sale.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Equi-
librium bidding behavior will be characterized in Section 3. Section 4 carries out revenue
comparison. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 THE MODEL
This is a two-period sequential auction model with two risk-neutral bidders. The auction-
eer has two identical nondurable goods for sale, one per period. The auction formats we
consider include: sequential first-price, second-price, English and Dutch auctions with the
announcement of winning and losing status, of winning bid, of losing bid and of both bids,
at the end of the first stage. Bidder i’s valuation is vi, where i = 1, 2. Both valuations are iid
over the unit interval [0, 1] according to the density f(v), which is continuously differentiable
and bounded away from zero. After each bidder observes her valuation at the first round,
her valuation remains constant since then, i.e., her second-stage valuation will be the same
as her first-stage one. So here we assume a perfect cross-period correlation of valuations.
The discount factor is δ, where δ ∈ [0, 1]. Each bidder will maximize her discounted sum of
surplus and the auctioneer her discounted sum of revenue.
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3.3 CHARACTERIZATION OF EQUILIBRIUM
Since we assume bidders are ex ante identical, it is natural for us to focus on symmet-
ric monotonic PBNE. As we will see later, in some formats, bidders will have to adopt a
mixed strategy. In this paper, we are going to restrict ourselves to those equilibria with a
monotonicity requirement defined as follows. Let I(v) and S(v) denote the inf and sup of a
bidder’s randomized bids with valuation v at a given stage.4 Whenever v2 > v1, we should
have I(v2) > I(v1) and S(v2) > S(v1). Notice that the cost of this monotonicity requirement
is that it may rule out pooling equilibria and may give rise to a non-existence problem, which
is indeed the case as we see later. The benefit of it, however, is to ensure the revenues are
compared within the same category of equilibria (monotonic equilibria only) so that we can
maintain the maximum uniformity when discussing the ranking here relative to the other
rankings in literature that typically use monotonic equilibria.
3.3.1 Outcome Equivalence Simplification
In the sequential IPV environment, the standard Dutch auction has the same equilibrium
outcome as the first-price auction with the announcement of winning bid at each stage.
This is because when a standard Dutch auction, e.g., the flower auction, ends, all bidders
can publicly observe the winning bid. Of course, the standard Dutch auction technology
can also be altered to accommodate all other information disclosure requirements. These
variants of the standard Dutch auction are outcome equivalent to their sequential first-price
counterparts too. So there is no loss of generality for us to focus our subsequent analysis on
the sequential first-price auctions only.
Similarly, in the sequential environment, the standard English auction has the same
equilibrium outcome as the second-price auction with the announcement of losing bid at
each stage. That is because when a standard English auction ends, all bidders can publicly
observe all the losing bids. Also, the standard English auction technology can be modified to
meet all other information release requirements. Again, because of the outcome equivalence,
4A pure strategy is considered a degenerate mixed strategy.
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our analysis can only be concentrated on the sequential second-price auctions.
Therefore, we will study the sequential first-price and second-price auctions with the
announcement of winning or losing status, winning bid, losing bid and both bids in the rest
of the paper.
3.3.2 Sequential Second-Price Auctions
The bidding behavior in the sequential second-price auctions is easy to characterize because
bidders bid the same way regardless of interperiod information release structures. The
following proposition states the equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 1 In the two-stage sequential second-price auctions with perfect cross-period
correlation of valuations, bidding one’s own valuation at both stages constitutes a monotonic
equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
However here bidding one’s own valuation will not constitute a dominant strategy equi-
librium any more as in the one-shot second-price auction. Also, it is interesting to observe
that different interperiod information disclosures do not affect bidders’ bidding behavior at
all. This is because bidding one’s own valuation is still a dominant strategy for the last
stage, which gives bidders no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium at the first stage. It
is not obvious whether there exist other symmetric monotonic equilibria or not. The current
equilibrium will be the only one if we assume bidders simply want to play a stage dominant
strategy at each period.
3.3.3 Sequential First-Price Auctions
The bidding behavior in the sequential first-price auctions is much more complicated. Under
different interperiod information release structures, bidders bid differently. Consequently the
interperiod information disclosure plays a crucial role for the auctioneer’s revenue. We begin
with the analysis of information release of the first-stage winning/losing status, where the
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identity of winner or loser will be announced once the first-stage auction ends.5
3.3.3.1 Announcement of the First-StageWinning/Losing Status We are looking
for a monotonic pure strategy symmetric equilibrium in this game and it has the following
structure.
Equilibrium beliefs and strategies:
1. At the first stage, each bidder bids according to the bid function β (v).
2. At the second stage, if the bidder wins the first stage at the valuation v, she believes
that her rival’s valuation vˆ falls in the interval of [0, v) with the conditional density
f (vˆ)
F (v)
.6
Then she bids according to β1 (v). While if she loses the first stage, she believes that her
rival’s valuation vˆ will be in [v, 1] with the conditional density
f (vˆ)
1− F (v) , and bids according
to β2 (v) .
Notice that at the second stage each bidder’ belief on her rival’s valuation distribution
is parameterized by her own private signal. However, in a standard one-shot auction envi-
ronment, bidders’ beliefs on valuation distribution are common knowledge. This difference
makes it impossible to directly apply the standard equilibrium existence results in the auc-
tion literature to here. But similarity between the structure of our setting and the standard
auction environment enables us to extend established approaches to the current case. The
following proposition gives us a confirmation of the existence of the above equilibrium in the
sequential first-price auction.
Proposition 2 In the two-stage sequential first-price auction with perfect cross-period cor-
relation of valuations, there exists a monotonic pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium under
the first-stage winning/losing status announcement.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proof makes use of the results in Landsberger, Rubinstein, Wolfstetter and Zamir
(2001), who study an auction environment with commonly known ranking of valuations.
It is exactly our second-stage problem. Theorem 1 in Landsberger et al (2001) gives us
5Notice that announcing the winner’s or the loser’s identity discloses the same information in the two-
bidder model.
6As we are looking for a symmetric monotonic equilibrium, a bidder’s winning implies her rival’s valuation
is smaller than hers.
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an equilibrium existence and uniqueness result among all differentiable bid functions for
the second-stage problem. Using this result, the existence of the first-stage equilibrium
bid function is immediate. In fact, we can further show that both stages’ equilibrium bid
functions must be differentiable drawing on the method in Maskin and Riley (2003), which
combined with Theorem 1 in Landsberger et al (2001) yields the uniqueness of pure-strategy
equilibrium for this two-stage problem. As we will not focus on the uniqueness issue in this
paper, its proof is forgone.
The symmetric monotonic pure-strategy equilibrium can not be analytically solved. This
makes a final revenue comparison impossible. But a revenue ranking is important to illumi-
nate the role of information disclosure in sequential auctions. So we assume the valuation
density f(v) = 1, i.e., we assume bidders’ valuations are iid uniform over [0, 1]. Our sub-
sequent revenue ranking will be under this simplifying assumption. In the current case the
closed-form solutions to the bid functions still can not be obtained under the iid uniform
assumption. However, we can find some qualitative features for the equilibrium bid func-
tions, which are collected in the following proposition and sufficient for our final revenue
comparison.
Proposition 3 Under the assumption that bidders’ valuations are iid uniform, the equilib-
rium bid functions have the following properties:
a) β1 (0) = β2 (0) = 0 and β1 (1) = β2 (1) = t
∗, where t∗ is both bidders’ common terminal
bid.
b) β1 (v) and β2 (v) are strictly concave and convex respectively.
c)
3
4
v > β2 (v) > t
∗v > β1 (v) >
1
2
v for all v ∈ (0, 1).
d)
2
3
≥ t∗ ≥ 5
8
e) β(v) =
v
2
(1− δ) + δ
v
∫ v
0
β2 (t) dt <
v
2
for all v ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Property a) says that two bid functions at the second stage has the same starting and
ending points. This result is standard. Property b) shows that both bid functions behave
regularly, which is a result due to the uniform distribution assumption. Property c) offers us
some bounds to approximate the two bid functions.
v
2
and
3v
4
can be shown to be tangent
to β1(v) and β2(v) at the point v = 0 respectively. So the two bid functions are enclosed by
23
their respective tangent lines at the origin and separated by the line t∗v. Property d) gives
us rather narrow bounds for the common end bid t∗. Property e) gives us an expression for
the first-stage bid function, which is smaller than
v
2
for all v ∈ (0, 1), where v
2
is just the
equilibrium bid function in a one-shot auction of two bidders with iid uniform signal. Also
from Property e), we can see that the first-stage bid function is an increasing function of δ.
These properties will be useful for our revenue comparison. Also they give us a very
intuitive understanding of bidders’ behavior in this sequential first-price auction. First,
because of information disclosure, bidders have less private information at the second stage
than in a standard one-shot auction. So they can obtain less informational rent, which
explains why both of them bid more aggressively in the second round than in a one-shot
auction. Second, after the first-stage auction, the first-period loser will believe that her rival
is stronger than her previous expectation while the winner will believe her rival is weaker
than her previous expectation. This induces the loser to bid more aggressively than the
winner at the second stage. Third, both bidders will bid less aggressively than in a one-shot
auction in the first round, which we call bid reduction in this paper. Bid reduction is a direct
result of bidders’ optimal decision of intertemporal substitution. In the second stage, the
first stage winner and loser bid quite differently, which provides an intertemporal arbitrage
opportunity for bidders. In the first stage, it is profitable for a bidder to bid less than in a
one-shot auction only. This is because by doing so at the second stage this bidder will have
a higher chance to meet a first-stage winner, who is easier to defeat than a first-stage loser.
This explains why in equilibrium a bid reduction can occur in the first stage. Finally, as to
the effect of the discount factor δ, once it becomes bigger, the second-stage payoff has higher
value for the bidder, which naturally promotes her intertemporal substitution, i.e., leading
to larger first-stage bid reduction.
3.3.3.2 Announcement of the First-Stage Winning Bid Now, we come to the anal-
ysis of bidding behavior under more interperiod information disclosure—announcing the win-
ning bid at the end of the first stage. So not only the winning and losing status, but also
the winning bid becomes common knowledge at the second stage. Again, we are looking
for a symmetric monotonic equilibrium. It is easy to show that there is no pure-strategy
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monotonic equilibrium in this game. So we focus our attention to the following equilibrium,
where both bidders follow the same monotonic pure-strategy bid function in the first stage
and the first-stage winner will adopt a mixed strategy at the second stage.
Equilibrium beliefs and strategies:
1. At the first stage, each bidder bids according to the bid function β (v).
2. At the second stage, if the bidder wins the first stage with her valuation v, then she
believes that her rival’s valuation falls in the interval of [0, v) with the conditional density
f (vˆ)
F (v)
. She will randomly choose a bid b on the support (t∗, t∗] with density gv (b).7 While
if a bidder loses the first stage at the valuation v and infers that the winning valuation is v˜
from the winning bid announcement, she will bid β v˜2 (v).
8
There are two important features of the above equilibrium. One is that the first-stage
winner adopts a randomized strategy at the second stage. The other is that both bidders have
to condition their second-stage bids on the announcement of the first-stage winning bid. The
equilibrium existence result for general density f(.) can be shown in the similar backward
induction manner as in the Proof of Proposition 2. Notice that the second-stage equilibrium
is a generalization of the asymmetric auction example in Vickrey (1961). So by applying the
refinement argument in Vickery (1961), we will have a unique equilibrium outcome here with
an additional assumption that bidders will always choose strategies involving least mixing.
For the purpose of revenue comparison, we will derive the specific equilibrium strategies only
for the uniformly distributed valuations.
Proposition 4 Under the assumption that bidders’ valuations are iid uniform, in the two-
stage sequential first-price auction with perfect cross-period correlation of valuations, bidders
will exhibit the following equilibrium behavior under the first-stage winning bid announce-
ment: both bidders bid
v
2
in the first stage; the first-stage winner randomizes over (
v
2
,
3v
4
]
according to the c.d.f. Gv (b) =
v
2 (2b− v)e
4b− 3v
2b− v ; the first-stage loser will not bid if her
valuation v ∈ [0, v˜
4
), where v˜ is the inferred valuation of the first-stage winner, and bid v˜− v˜
2
4v
if v ∈ [ v˜
4
, v˜).
7Notice that for different v, the randomization density g is also different.
8Also the functional form of βv˜2 (.) is parameterized by the announcement.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The above is a symmetric monotonic equilibrium as we define it at the beginning of
Section 3. Notice that if the first-stage winner’s valuation is v˜ and the first-stage loser’s
valuation is v, the winner will bid above
v˜
2
and the loser will bid v˜ − v˜
2
4v
. v˜ − v˜
2
4v
is smaller
than
v˜
2
for all v <
v˜
2
. This means that in equilibrium when the first-stage loser’s valuation
is smaller than a half of the winner’s, the loser always loses the second stage. Under this
contingency, other bid functions for the first-stage loser can also constitute a monotonic
equilibrium as long as the submitted bid is smaller than a half of the winner’s valuation and
at the same time prevents the winner’s deviation. Of course, these equilibria will all yield the
same outcome. But our equilibrium in Proposition 4 is the only one that can describe the
first-stage loser’s strategy in just one function, hence making the derivation of the first-stage
bid function tractable.9
The intuition for the above equilibrium bidding behavior is straight forward. First, since
the first-stage winner’s valuation is always commonly known at the beginning of the second
stage, it is not surprising that the winner will randomize in order to offset this information
asymmetry. Second, the first-stage loser obtains some informational advantage at the second
stage, i.e., knowing the winner’s valuation. As the loser is weaker than the winner in the first
place, this extra information enables both bidders to compete on a relatively level ground.
So in equilibrium no bidder’s second-stage bid function can dominate the other. In contrast,
in the previous case the loser’s bid function always lies above that of the winner. Third,
there is no bid reduction in the first stage because there exists no intertemporal arbitrage
opportunity. At the second stage, it is as hard to defeat a first stage loser as to defeat
a winner since now two bidders’ strength is brought in line with each other by the loser’s
informational advantage. So no bidder has the incentive to overbid or underbid in the first
stage. Finally, the discount factor δ does not enter the first-stage bid function. This is
natural since bidders do not need to consider the intertemporal substitution at all.
9Kaplan and Zamir (2000) derive almost the same second-stage equilibrium in their Proposition 5.2. The
only difference is that they assume that the first-stage loser bids her own valuation when her valuation is
less than a half of the winner’s inferred valuation. The equilibrium in Kaplan and Zamir (2000) truncates
the bid function βv˜2 (v) , which makes the analytical derivation of the first-stage bid function rather difficult.
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3.3.3.3 Announcement of the First-Stage Losing Bid Now instead of announcing
the winning bid, the auctioneer can also choose to only release the first-stage losing bid in a
sequential first-price auction. Before we start to solve for the equilibrium, our intuition from
the previous analysis will lead to the following conjecture. The first-stage loser is already on
the weak side at the second stage. Announcing her bid gives further informational advantage
to the winner, which only exacerbates the loser’s position and will induce quite aggressive
bidding for the loser at the second stage. Consequently there will be a large bid reduction
in the first stage. This is because by following the same intertemporal arbitrage reasoning,
the first-stage bidder will have a high incentive to underbid so that her chance to meet an
aggressive first-stage loser can be decreased. Although the above conjecture is in the right
direction, the following proposition shows that the strength of the first-stage bid reduction
can be so big that no symmetric monotonic equilibrium can be supported regardless of the
value of discount factor δ.
Proposition 5 In the two-stage sequential first-price auction with perfect cross-period cor-
relation of valuations, there is no symmetric monotonic equilibrium under the first-stage
losing bid announcement.
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is not clear if there exist other asymmetric or non-monotonic equilibria in this case.
But the non-existence of an important class of equilibria here may shed light on the phe-
nomenon that it is very rare to observe any real world sequential first-price or Dutch auction
arrangements where the auctioneer discloses each stage’s losing bid only.
3.3.3.4 Announcement of both the First-Stage Winning and Losing Bids Under
this format, the auctioneer releases all the information available to her, i.e., both the winning
and losing bids, by the end of the first stage. If we assume a symmetric monotonic pure-
strategy bid function for the first stage, then both bidders will exactly infer each other’s
valuation from the interperiod information release. At the second stage, if a bidder loses the
first stage with a valuation v, then she will face a rival whose valuation is vˆ where vˆ > v. The
type of the second-stage equilibria we are looking for is similar to those discussed in Blume
(2003). The loser will randomize according to the density h(v) over the support [v′ − η, v′)
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where v′ ∈ [v, vˆ), η > 0 and the winner with high valuation vˆ bids v′. So the sup of the
loser’s randomized bids should be between her and the winner’s valuations and the whole
randomization builds a wall that prevents the winner from bidding less than this sup. We
assume that bidders choose strategies with least mixing. This assumption will lead to a
large class of equilibria parameterized by v′, η, and the randomization density h(v). It is
analytically intractable to derive those equilibria when the parameters remain general. So
we will only focus on a subset of this class of equilibria. As we will see below, this subset of
equilibria turn out to generate the same auction revenue.
Since v′ ∈ [v, vˆ), it is natural to set v′ as a weight average of v and vˆ, i.e., (1− k)v+ kvˆ,
where k ∈ (0, 1). For analytical convenience, we set η as v′ − v, i.e., we simply let the
first-stage loser randomize over the support of [v, (1− k) v + kvˆ). We also assume h(v) to
be a uniform density. So the equilibrium will be as follows:
Equilibrium beliefs and strategies:
1. At the first stage, each bidder bids according to the bid function β (v).
2. At the second stage, both the first-stage winner’s and loser’s valuations vˆ and v become
common knowledge. The loser randomizes uniformly over the support [v, (1− k) v + kvˆ),
while the winner bids (1− k) v + kvˆ.
The above equilibrium is a symmetric and monotonic one according to our definition.
But in order to support it, we need an extra assumption specified in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The above equilibrium is supportable only when
1
2
≥ k ≥ δ
1 + δ
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When k >
1
2
, the first-stage loser’s randomization density wall is not high enough to
prevent the winner’s penetration (deviation) at the second stage. While if k <
δ
1 + δ
, a
bidder can always profitably mimic the zero valuation at the first stage. This deviation can
only be prevented by asking the first-stage loser to bid sufficiently above her valuation so as
to stop the winner from bidding too leniently at the second stage, which in turn will eliminate
bidders’ incentive to underbid in the first stage. The final equilibrium is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 6 Under the assumption that bidders’ valuations are iid uniform, in the two-
stage sequential first-price auctions with perfect cross-period correlation of valuations, bid-
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ders will exhibit the following behavior under both the first-stage winning and losing bids
announcement: both bidders bid
(1− δk)v
2
in the first stage, where k ∈ [ δ
1 + δ
,
1
2
]. The
first-stage loser randomizes uniformly over [vl, (1− k) vl + kvh) and the first-stage winner
bids (1− k) vl + kvh, where vl and vh are the realized valuations of the loser and the winner
respectively.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above result has almost the same interpretation as in the case of sequential first-
price auctions with the announcement of winning/losing status. The first-stage loser bids
aggressively at the second stage. Bid reduction appears in the first stage, which becomes
more serious when discount factor δ gets bigger. We can also check that the total revenue in
this two-stage auction is
1
3
+
1
3
δ (see Lemma 4 in next section), which does not contain the
weight k. It means that bidders’ intertemporal substitution exactly cancels out the effect of
k. So the revenue remain the same within this subset of equilibria. We conjecture that this
property may be extended to the original large class of equilibria.
3.4 REVENUE COMPARISON
By now, we have either derived equilibria or their properties in all considered sequential
auction formats under the iid uniform assumption. We are ready to compare the revenue
generated from each of them. Due to the simplification at the beginning of Section 3, we
only need to consider the following four revenues. First, the revenue from the sequential
second-price auctions, which is denoted as R1. Second, the revenues from the sequential
first-price auctions with the announcement of the first-stage winning/losing status, winning
bid, and both winning and losing bids. We denote them as R2, R3, R4 respectively. Notice
that there is no symmetric monotonic equilibrium in the sequential first-price auction with
the announcement of the first-stage losing bid, so we leave it out of our revenue comparison.
From Proposition 1, we know that R1 =
1
3
+
δ
3
. The calculations for the other revenues
are much more involved. Lemma 2 gives us an upper bound for R2 although no bid functions
can be analytically obtained for the case.
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Lemma 2 The revenue R2 <
1
3
+
16
49
δ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The bound of R3 is stated in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 The revenue R3 >
1
3
+
1
3
δ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Finally, we need to calculate R4. Lemma 4 states the result.
Lemma 4 The revenue R4 =
1
3
+
1
3
δ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 7 Under the assumption that bidders valuations are iid uniform, the revenue
ranking is: R3 > R1 = R4 > R2.
The following table summarizes all the revenue results we have obtained. We use I, II and
III to denote R3, R1 and R2 respectively. So I, II and III represent revenues in descending
order. The first row of the table represents 4 different information release structures, where
from left to right more and more information is disclosed. The first column represents four
basic stage auction rules, where the first-price and second-price are outcome equivalent to
the Dutch and English auctions respectively.
Table I. Revenue from Sequential Auctions with iid Uniform Valuations
Auction Formats W/L Status W Bid L Bid W & L Bids
First/Dutch III I — II
Second/English II II II II
From the above table, we can easily see that the interperiod information disclosure is
immaterial in the sequential second-price and English auctions because the intertemporal
learning does not affect bidders’ equilibrium bidding. Notice that in sequential environment,
the first-price and Dutch formats can revenue dominate the second-price and English formats.
This is because under the first two the auctioneer has an extra device, i.e., the intertemporal
information disclosure, to affect bidders’ bidding and increase the total revenue.
It is commonly known that more information revelation from the auctioneer can further
facilitate bidders’ competition, hence increasing the revenue. A series of theorems in Milgrom
and Weber (1982), which we abbreviate as MW hereafter, show that the public reporting
policy never decreases the revenue in all auction formats. But the above table tells us that
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more information does not necessarily increase the revenue. From the announcement of
the winning/losing status to the announcement of the winning bid only, revenue from the
sequential first-price auctions increases. But as more information is released, i.e., both the
winning and losing bids are announced, the revenue drops again.
Then we might ask why our results are so different from those in MW and how to
explain the relationship between the intertemporal information disclosure and the auction
revenue in our environment. There are two critical differences between our environment
and that in MW. First, MW considers one-shot auction, while this paper studies sequential
auctions. Second, in MW, the auctioneer’s information affects both bidders’ own valuations
and their inference of their rivals’ valuations. So the information disclosure creates both
the valuation-increasing effect because bidders’ valuations are assumed to be monotonically
increasing with the announced signal, and the inference effect. But in this paper, the auc-
tioneer’s information does not change bidders’ own valuations and we only have the inference
effect here. In our setting, it is still true that more information disclosure never decreases
the stage auction revenue. Drawing on the results in the proofs of Lemma 2 to 4, it is easy
to check that the second-stage revenues in the first-price and Dutch formats are consistently
improved by more and more intertemporal information release. However, as auctions are
conducted sequentially, increased second-stage revenue does not guarantee a higher overall
two-stage revenue because of bidders’ intertemporal substitution. If the interperiod infor-
mation structure is such that an intertemporal arbitrage opportunity exists for bidders to
profitably shade their bids in the first stage, then in equilibrium a first-stage bid reduction
will occur which in turn will lead to a decreased first-stage revenue. So overall, the two-stage
revenue may not be enhanced. Therefore, the best information release structure should be
the one that not only intensifies the second-stage bidding competition but also eliminates the
intertemporal arbitrage opportunity, hence the first-stage bid reduction. The announcement
of the first-stage winning bid in the sequential first-price and Dutch auctions just satisfies this
informational requirement hence yielding the highest revenue among all considered formats.
Then we conclude that it is not the information volume but the information structure that
actually matters in term of revenue maximization in sequential auctions. The general rule
is to give the auction loser some informational advantage. If we push the above argument
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further, it is natural to ask whether there exists such an information structure that provides
an opposite intertemporal arbitrage incentive to induce overbidding in the first stage. This
is possible only when the first-stage loser bids less aggressively than the winner at the second
stage, which may happen under other valuation evolution assumptions but not in our setting.
3.5 CONCLUSION
This paper characterizes equilibria in various two-stage sequential auction formats under all
possible forms of interperiod information release in an IPV model. We study the role of
interperiod information disclosure in affecting bidders’ intertemporal learning, bidding, and
auction revenue. Unlike Milgrom andWeber (1982), who show in their model that it is always
good for the auctioneer to commit to complete information revelation, we find that this is
not necessarily the case in sequential auctions. Information disclosure does not affect the
revenue in the sequential second-price and English auctions. In the sequential first-price and
Dutch auctions, more information release can even decrease the revenue. This is because in
sequential environment bidders’ intertemporal substitution may lead to bid reduction in the
first stage, which outweighs the second-stage revenue gain from the interperiod information
release, hence decreasing the overall revenue. We show that the standard sequential Dutch
auction or the first-price auction with the first-stage winning bid announcement generates
the highest revenue among all considered formats just because their information release
structure facilitates the second-stage competition and at the same time avoids the first-stage
bid reduction. As a first step study of sequential auctions with multi-unit demand, our
results are derived in a two-stage two-bidder model. Extensions to arbitrary number of
bidders and stages; more general distribution and interperiod relation of bidders’ valuations,
etc., are left for future work.
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4.0 A RESALE EXPLANATION FOR DECLINING PRICES IN
SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The declining price trend in sequential auctions has long been a puzzle in auction research.
Empirical findings of declining prices have been reported in such papers as Milgrom and We-
ber (1982b) in transponder-leases auctions; Ashenfelter (1989) , McAfee and Vincent (1993)
and Ginsburgh (1998) in wine auctions; Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) in real-estate auc-
tions; Beggs and Graddy (1997) in art auctions and Gerard J. van den Berg, Jan C. van Ours
and Menno P. Pradhan (2001) in flower auctions, etc. In a sequential auction of identical
objects, we normally expect a similar sale price for each object. This is analytically shown in
Weber (1983). So the phenomenon that prices decline in a repeated sale of identical objects
poses an anomaly, which is often termed as declining price anomaly in the auction literature.
A number of theoretical studies explain this declining price anomaly from various perspec-
tives. From the perspective of bidder preferences, McAfee and Vincent (1993) attribute the
declining price trend to the non-decreasing absolute risk aversion of bidders; and Branco
(1997) to synergies. From the perspective of auction structures, Milgrom and Weber (1982b)
suggest that the use of agents in auctions may explain the declining prices; Black and De
Meza (1993) explain this price trend with a buyer’s option, which is that the winner of the
first auction has the opportunity to buy the remaining objects at the winning price; Von der
Fehr (1994) and Menezes and Monteiro (1997) relate the declining price trend to the auction
participation costs. From the perspective of the nature of the objects, Engelbrecht-Wiggans
(1994), Bernhardt and Scoones (1994), and Gale and Hausch (1994) explain the declining
prices with heterogeneity of the objects.
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A common characteristic of the above theoretical literature is that almost all of them
assume bidders have single-unit demand, i.e., once a bidder obtains one unit of the object at
a given stage auction, she will not participate in following stages. However, in many cases
where a declining price path is detected, this assumption does not seem to be appropriate.
For example, in the condominium auctions (Ashenfelter and Genesove, 1992) and flower
auctions (Gerard J. van den Berg, Jan C. van Ours and Menno P. Pradhan, 2001), bidders
tend to be the investors, who purchase the objects not for their own consumption but for
the resale values. Therefore, these bidders will participate in the auction every period as
long as they remain in business. Then it is natural to ask if there are some new theoretical
explanations for the declining price anomaly that rest upon the assumption that bidders
have multi-unit demand.
The difficulty with the sequential auction with multi-unit demand is that bidders be-
come asymmetric after the intertemporal inference following the first-round auction. This
in general makes an analytical solution impossible. But if we dispose of the intertemporal
inference by allowing each bidder to have a random draw of signal in every round, the sequen-
tial auction will then be reduced to the repeated auction. This paper proposes a sequential
common-value auction framework that can both maintain certain degree of intertemporal
inference and at the same time accommodate bidder symmetry. The crucial assumption of
our model is that the common market resale price at a given period is an aggregation of both
a common fundamental and all bidders’ idiosyncratic tastes.1 The fundamental is assumed
to be a martingale and bidders’ idiosyncratic tastes are assumed to be cross-period iid. Then
for a given object, its current-stage resale price will be parameterized by the realized resale
price of the previous stage. This cross-period correlation of resale prices aims to capture the
persistence of consumer preferences in the final consumption market.2
In this paper, we obtain the following two findings. First, bidding prices decline in
expectation in the two-stage sequential auction under an sufficient equilibrium condition we
propose. Second, we characterize the necessary properties of symmetric monotonic equilibria
in the finite N-stage and the infinite-stage cases. In the former case, the price trend remains
1Notice that the declining price anomaly refers to the declining bidding prices in a sequential auction,
not the resale prices we mention here.
2Notice that here bidders are the investors who aim for the resale of the objects to the final consumers.
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constant and drops only at the last stage; in the latter case, we have a constant price trend
throughout.3
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model.
Section 3 gives the equilibrium solutions. Section 4 concludes.
4.2 THE MODEL
We first set up the sequential first-price common-value auction model in a two-stage envi-
ronment. There is one nondurable object for sale at each period t, where t = 1, 2. There are
N risk-neutral bidders. There is no reserve price. At the end of each period t, all bidders’
bids submitted in this period will be announced. Bidders pursue the object not for their
own consumption, but aim to resell it at the current-period resale price Pt. The value of
Pt is realized immediately after the object is auctioned at period t and Pt becomes publicly
observable since then. An object can always be auctioned at a given period because there
is no reserve. We assume that it can always be resold at that period due to its perishabil-
ity. Bidder 1, 2, ...N observe their private signals X1t , X
2
t , ...X
N
t respectively at period t. All
bidders’ signals are iid according to the density f (.) over the support [0, ω]. These signals
represent bidders’ idiosyncratic tastes for the object at a given period. We assume that Pt
is the aggregation of all bidders’ individual
tastes and some fundamental value.4 The fundamental value is an unobservable random
variable Θt, which is drawn from a density with mean θ¯ at period 1 and follows a martingale
process at period 2, i.e., EΘ2 = θ1. So the fundamental value itself does not exhibit any
trend in expectation. We assume Pt = αΘt + (1− α)U(X1t , X2t , ...XNt ), where U (.) is both
3Weber (1983) produces a constant price trend too but in a finite-stage, single-unit demand setting.
4Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) produce a time-series plot of the condominium auction bids, which
reflects bidders’ private signals, and the associated resale prices. They discover that there exists a strong
correlation between the resale prices and the bids submitted in auctions. It seems that these two variables
are linked and we assume here that the linkage is through an unobservable fundamental.
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symmetric and increasing in each of its arguments. The resale price Pt is a weighted average
of the fundamental and an aggregation of the collective signals represented by U (.) .5 We
assume the fundamental value and bidders’ tastes are statistically independent. We will
use the lower case notations pt, θt and x
i
t to denote the realized values of Pt,Θt and X
i
t
respectively hereafter. The discount factor is δ.
The generalization of the setup to arbitrary stages is straightforward—just change EΘ2 =
θ1 to EΘt+1 = θt where t is any natural number smaller than the total number of stages.
4.3 EQUILIBRIUM
4.3.1 The Two-stage Problem
In the two-stage sequential auction, we are looking for a monotonic symmetric equilibrium.
The equilibrium will take the following form:
Time 1. At the first stage, bidder i observes a signal xi1 and bids according to β1 (x
i
1) .
Time 2. The object is awarded to the bidder with the highest bid and all bids are announced.
Then all bidders’ private signals become common knowledge from the bid function β1 (x
i
1).
Whenever a bid not belonging to the support [β1 (0), β2 (ω)] is observed, its associated signal
will always be inferred as zero.6
Time 3. The unobservable fundamental value Θ1 is realized as θ1. The resale price p1 is
formed according to p1 = αθ1+(1− α)U(x11, x21, ...xN1 ) and then becomes publicly observable.
Time 4. The first-stage winner resells the object at the price p1.
Time 5. At the second stage, bidder i observes a signal xi2 and bids according to
β2
(
p1, x
1
1, x
2
1, ...x
N
1 , x
i
2
)
, where the second-stage bid function conditions on all available in-
formation.
5We can make more general assumption for Pt like Pt = Uˆ(Θt, X1t , X
2
t , ...X
N
t ). While in such situations,
once Uˆ(.) is not linear in Θt, Uˆ(Θt, .) tends to exhit certain trend even when Θt is a martingale. For example,
if Uˆ(.) is concave or convex in Θt, Uˆ(Θt, .) turns out to be a submartingale or supermartingale respectively.
To avoid a price trend brought by the evolution of the fundmental vaule itself rather than bidders’ strategic
interactions, we choose to focus on Uˆ(.) being linear in Θt in this paper.
6Since we can freely specify the off-equilibrium path belief, this assumption helps to restrict the equilib-
rium bids to a closed interval in the simplest way.
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We will start to solve for the above equilibrium from the second stage.
4.3.1.1 The Second-stage Problem Let us assume for the moment that all bidders
follow a symmetric monotonic pure-strategy bid function truthfully at the first stage. With
the disclosure of all bidders’ bids, the first-stage private signals x11, x
2
1, ..., x
N
1 become common
knowledge. Since p1 is publicly observable at the second stage, the unobservable θ1 can be
inferred from the equation of resale price formation described above. Bidders’ signals are
cross-period independent, while Θ1 is correlated with Θ2, so the only valuable information
bidders will condition on at the second stage is the inferred true value of θ1. The first-stage
information p1, x
1
1, x
2
1, ...x
N
1 will affect the bid only through the aggregated variable θ1. Then
the second-stage problem becomes a standard one-shot auction with public information. Now
we introduce some new notation: X−it = {X1t , X2t , ...XNt }\{X it}; x−it = {x1t , x2t , ...xNt }\{xit};
Y it = max
s 6=i
Xst . Then the following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 1 Assuming that a symmetric monotonic equilibrium exists, the second-stage
equilibrium bid function β2
(
p1, x
i
1, x
−i
1 , x
i
2
)
equals :
p1 − (1− α)U(xi1, x−i1 ) + (1− α)EY i2 {EX−i2 [U(Y i2 , X
−i
2 )|Y i2 ]|Y i2 < xi2} .
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is easy to see that the above second-stage bid function is monotonically increasing in
a bidder’s second-stage signal but decreasing in all bidders’ first-stage signals. In our model,
this feature is the key that leads to a declining price path as we will see soon.
4.3.1.2 The First-stage Problem Now we start to solve for the first stage equilibrium
bid function. According to the second-stage bid function in Proposition 1, we observe that
if bidder i mimics a higher type than her true one in the first stage, her opponents will
bid lower in the second stage. This fact can be understood through bidder i’s opponents’
intertemporal inference of the unobservable fundamental. Once the opponents observe a
high bid at the first stage, i.e., a high signal from bidder i, their inference of the first-stage
fundamental value will be low for a given resale price p1 according to its functional form.
Since the fundamental is a martingale, the opponents will be induced to believe that the
mean of the second-stage fundamental is low hence bid low.
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So bidder i’s logic for mimicking a higher type at the first stage can be described as
follows: “I know that I may bid a little bit higher than the expected resale value of the
object at the first stage. But I just want to create a false image of narrow margin between
my bid and the realized resale price. Then my opponents will believe that this object’s resale
value does not quite live up to my high taste, hence may have a low fundamental. They
then bid low at the second stage under their pessimistic expectations and I can easily win
the object with a low bid at that time. So my loss from overbidding in the first stage can be
compensated by the gain from underbidding in the second stage.” In equilibrium of course,
each bidder will have to bid truthfully. The above argument on bidders’ intertemporal
incentives explains why in equilibrium the truthful bidding in the first stage can turn out to
be more aggressive than that in the second stage.
The formal equilibrium derivation is outlined as follows. At the first stage, bidder i
with a private signal xi1 will maximize the expected overall two-stage payoff Π = Π1 +
δEX21 ,...,XN1 ,Θ1,X12Π2, where Π1 and Π2 are the first and second-stage payoffs respectively. We
assume bidder i mimics a type z 6= xi1 at the first stage. Then following any pair of (z, xi1),
there is an expected continuation optimal second-stage payoff EX21 ,...,XN1 ,Θ1,X12Π2(z, x
i
1) for
bidder i. So the first-stage bid function will be derived in such a way that setting z = xi1
will maximize the overall payoff Π. Let [EX−i1 U(., .)]
′ represent the derivative with respect to
the first argument of the function U(., .). Then the following proposition gives the first-stage
equilibrium bid function.
Proposition 2 Assuming that a symmetric monotonic equilibrium exists, the first-stage
equilibrium bid function β1 (x
i
1) equals :
αθ¯ + (1− α)EY i1 {EX−i1 [U(Y i1 , X
−i
1 )|Y i1 ] +
δ[EX−i1 U(Y
i
1 , X
−i
1 )]
′
N [FN−1 (Y i1 )]′
|Y i1 < xi1}.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We have derived both stages’ bid functions by assuming a symmetric monotonic equilib-
rium exists, the key point that remains to be checked is whether this pair of bid functions
indeed constitute a symmetric monotonic equilibrium. The following proposition gives the
answer.
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4.3.2 A Sufficient Equilibrium Condition
This section shows that a symmetric monotonic equilibrium exists for certain types of dis-
tribution F (.) and aggregation function U(.). The following proposition states a sufficient
equilibrium condition and confirms the declining equilibrium price trend.
Proposition 3 When the expression
[EX−i1 U(X
i
1, X
−i
1 )]
′
[FN−1 (X i1)]′
is increasing in X i1, the bid func-
tions derived in the above two propositions constitute a symmetric monotonic equilibrium.
Also, EXi1β1 (X
i
1) > EP1,Xi1,X
−i
1 ,X
i
2
β2
(
P1, X
i
1, X
−i
1 , X
i
2
)
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Mathematically, the monotonicity of
[EX−i1 U(X
i
1, X
−i
1 )]
′
[FN−1 (X i1)]′
guarantees the monotonicity of
the first-stage bid function, which in turn ensures the monotonicity of the second-stage bid
function. Under the above equilibrium condition, the bidding prices will exhibit declining
trend. Intuitively, this sufficient equilibrium condition can be understood through the anal-
ysis of bidders’ incentives. On the one hand, as we argued in Section 3.1.2., bidders have the
incentive to ”overbid” in the first stage in order to obtain the second-stage advantage. The
term [EX−i1 U(X
i
1, X
−i
1 )]
′ is just reduced from the expression that measures the gain from the
first-stage over-bidding. On the other hand, it is commonly known that bidders should shade
their bids sufficiently below their signals in a common-value auction to avoid the winner’s
curse. The term [FN−1 (X i1)]
′ represents the winning probability and can be considered as a
measure for the loss from the first-stage over-bidding due to an exacerbated winner’s curse.
The first-stage bidders then face these two conflicting incentives and they need to evaluate
their aggregated effect, which is measured by the quotient of these two terms. To preserve
the pure-strategy solution to the monotonic decision problem at the first stage, it is natural
to require that this overall effect to be monotonic in each bidder’s type. At the second stage,
there is no such conflicting incentives, hence the equilibrium solution is standard.
It is easy to check that the difference between EXi1β1 (X
i
1) and EP1,Xi1,X
−i
1 ,X
i
2
β2
(
P1, X
i
1, X
−i
1 , X
i
2
)
is
δ (1− α)
N
EXi1,Y i1 {
[EX−i1 U(Y
i
1 , X
−i
1 )]
′
[FN−1 (Y i1 )]′
|Y i1 < X i1}. From the expression of this difference, we
can see that the price drop tends to be more severe when we have a larger δ or a smaller α.
Bigger δ means that gaining the second-stage advantage is more important for the overall
payoff. In order to obtain bigger second-stage advantage, bidders should bid more aggres-
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sively in the first stage, leading to a larger price decline. Smaller α implies that the individual
tastes are more important in the formation of the resale price. So the strategic revelation of
bidders’ types can affect the total payoff in a higher degree, which in turn generates a larger
price drop. The above result of declining prices will still remain valid in a sequential second-
price common-value auction and other auction variants as long as the incentive structure
described in Section 3.1.2 is preserved.
4.3.3 Generalization
We then ask whether the above framework can be generalized to finite N (N>2) or infinite
stages and whether the declining price trend is still preserved there. In principle, our setup
can accommodate an analytical solution for the finite-stage problem since bidders remain
symmetric at any given round after processing the information from all previous rounds.
Then a backward induction will derive each stage’s bid function. However, this backward
induction is tractable only when we know the specific forms of the aggregation function U(.)
and the density f(.). In a two-bidder three-stage example, where f (.) is a uniform density
over [0, 1] and Pt =
1
3
(X1t +X
2
t ) +
2
3
Θt, we can find that the equilibrium bid functions are
β1 (x
1
1) =
1
3
x11 +
2
3
θ¯ +
δ
6
, β2 (x
1
2, θ1) =
1
3
x12 +
2
3
θ1 +
δ
6
and β3 (x
1
3, θ2) =
1
3
x13 +
2
3
θ2. Replacing
2
3
θt with pt − 1
3
(x1t + x
2
t ) for t = 1, 2, we can obtain the final expressions for the three bid
functions.
When U (.) and f (.) remain general, the backward induction becomes intractable as the
number of stages is more than 2. It is not clear whether a symmetric monotonic equilib-
rium exists for the more-than-two-stage problem. But we can still obtain some equilibrium
properties if an equilibrium exits, which are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When a symmetric monotonic equilibrium exists in the finite N-stage (N >
2) sequential auction, the equilibrium has the property: Eβ1 (.) = Eβ2 (.) ... = EβN−1 (.) >
EβN (.); when a stationary symmetric monotonic equilibrium exists in the infinite-stage se-
quential auction, the equilibrium has the property:Eβt (.) = Eβt+1 (.) ∀ t ∈ {1, 2, ...∞}.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above proposition shows that for a finite-stage problem, the bidding price drops in
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expectation only at the last stage. The reason for this phenomenon hinges on the Markovian
property of the fundamental and the cross-period independence of bidders’ signals. These
two factors make a bidder able to affect her rivals’ intertemporal inference only one period
ahead. Then in equilibrium, the gain from affecting future payoff will be the same for all
periods (since only the next period matters) except the last one (since there is no next
period), hence generating a constant price trend with a price drop only at the last stage. In
the infinite-stage case, there is no last stage throughout, so the price trend remains constant.
The intuition derived from the analysis of Proposition 4 gives rise to the following con-
jecture, which will be left for future study. We conjecture that the length of the cross-period
persistence of the object fundamental plays an important role in determining the declining
price trend. In a two-stage sequential auction, the fundamental is persistent across both
stages and the intertemporal inference generates a definite declining price trend. Now let us
consider a more general model where Pt = U
(
Θt.θt−1, ...θt−s, X it , X
−i
t
)
, i.e., the resale price
not only depends on the current period fundamental but also the fundamentals in previous
periods. Then if the fundamental is more persistent than a martingale, the current funda-
mental will be affected by the realized fundamentals from more-than-one previous rounds.
This general model seems to be hard to solve analytically at the moment. But its solution
may be conjectured from the learning interpretation obtained from the martingale case. For
example, if the fundamental is persistent across all stages, then at stage t, bidders can al-
ways affect more future stages hence bigger future payoff than at stage t + 1. Therefore,
bidders will have higher incentives to raise their bids at stage t than stage t + 1, which
may lead to a continuously declining price path. In another example, if the fundamental is
persistent only for 3 stages while the sequential auction has 5 rounds, then we would expect
Eβ1 (.) = Eβ2 (.) = Eβ3 (.) > Eβ4 (.) > Eβ5 (.). This is because bidders can affect future 2
rounds’ payoff (high future payoff) at stage 1, 2 and 3, while at stage 4 they can only affect
1 future round (medium future payoff) and at stage 5 zero round (low future payoff), then
bidders’ intertemporal decisions similar as those discussed in Section 3.1.2 tend to yield the
stated price trend. In a third example, if the auction rounds are far more than the length
of the persistence of the fundamental, like 50 rounds with a martingale fundamental, we
should then expect an relatively constant price trend. Therefore, price trends with varying
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degrees of declining can all be generated from adjusting the length of the persistence of the
fundamental.
4.4 CONCLUSION
This paper studies price trends in a sequential first-price common-value auction with resale.
It differs from the previous research in that it considers sequential auctions with multi-unit
demand. In the two-stage case, we propose a condition that guarantees the existence of a
symmetric monotonic equilibrium which exhibits a declining trend. This is because bidders
have the incentive to overbid in the first round to lower their rivals’ intertemporal inference
on the object value so that they can obtain a second-stage advantage. We also characterize
the necessary properties of symmetric monotonic equilibria in the finite N-stage and the
infinite-stage cases. In the former case, the price trend remains constant and drops only at
the last stage; in the latter case, we have a constant price trend throughout.
Future work will be devoted to showing the existence of equilibrium in general N-stage
(N>2) sequential auction and to investigating price trends when the fundamental is more
persistent than a martingale.
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5.0 CONCLUSION
This dissertation studies new bidding behaviors in such richer environments as with collusion,
strategic information disclosure and intertemporal inference. We first find that an endoge-
nously formed ring will include at least two members and is in general not all-inclusive. We
then show that in various two-stage sequential auctions, the standard sequential Dutch auc-
tion or the first-price auction with the first-stage winning bid announcement shall generate
the highest revenue. Finally, we propose a resale explanation for the declining price path in
sequential auctions with multi-unit demand.
Future research agenda aims to extend the current frameworks to more general settings.
For example, in the collusion analysis, we could consider cases where bidders are ex ante
heterogeneous; where there is more than one collusion initiator among bidders leading to
multiple rings in the auction; and other possible relaxations of those assumptions defin-
ing the bidders’ collusive technology. In the information disclosure investigation, we could
extend the two-bidder two-stage setting to arbitrary number of bidders and stages; more
general distribution and interperiod relation of bidders’ valuations. In the sequential auc-
tions’ intertemporal inference study, future work will be devoted to showing the existence
of equilibrium in general N-stage (N>2) sequential auction and to investigating price trends
when the fundamental is more persistent than a martingale.
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APPENDIX
Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 1.
Consider a contingency, where V is realized such that v1 is not the highest element and
v2 is, but βK(V ) assigns the largest bid βˆK(V ) to member 1. Now look at another bid
assignment rule β∗K(V ), which is the same as βK(V ) except that under the previously stated
contingency, β∗K(V ) assigns the largest bid βˆK(V ) to member 2. Notice that the largest bid
assigned under these two rules is still the same, the only difference is who obtains this bid.
The outsiders will bid the same under these two rules since they always compete against the
same bid function βˆK(V ) of the ring. Given the outsiders bid the same, Pr( βˆK(V )wins
the object) is the same under both rules. Since β∗K(V ) assigns the largest bid to member 2,
conditional on winning member 2 can capture more surplus v2 − βˆK(V ) for the ring than
what member 1 can, i.e., v1 − βˆK(V ). Therefore, the rule β∗K(V ) outperforms βK(V ) under
this particular contingency. It follows that the bid assignment rule that maximizes the per
member surplus GK must always assigns the largest bid to the highest report.
So GK becomes
1
K
Ev1...vK [(v− βˆK(V )) Pr( βˆK(V )wins the object)|v is the highest report
in V ]. Consider two contingencies where the valuations V = (v1, ...vK) and V
′ = (v′1, ...v
′
K)
are realized such that max{v1, ...vK} = max{v′1, ...v′K} = v and V \{v} 6= V ′\{v}, i.e., the
highest report in V and V ′ is the same but the other reports are not all the same. Assume
βˆK(V ) assigns different bids to the highest-report member under these two contingencies. If
the per member surplus GK is different under these two bids, then there exists a profitable
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deviation from βˆK(V ) in at least one of the contingencies. If GK is the same under these two
bids, assigning either bid to both contingencies does not change the surplus. Therefore, to
constitute an equilibrium, an optimal βˆK(V ) (if there exists one) shall have such a property
that for the same highest report v, the assigned bid shall be the same regardless of other
reports. It implies that βˆK(V ) is solely determined by the element v, where v is the highest
report in V . Hence Then there is no loss of generality for us to focus on the bid assignment
rule that conditions on v only. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.
From the results of Maskin and Riley (2000b), (2003), Athey (2001) and Lebrun (2002)
etc, we know that there exists a unique pair of equilibrium bid functions βinK (v) and β
out
K (v)
that solves equations (I ′) and (II ′) in Section 4.1. Furthermore, βinK (v) and β
out
K (v) are
monotonic and βinK (v) = β
out
K (v)=v, β
in
K (v) = β
out
K (v) = β
∗
K . So Property (a) is the standard
boundary result.
Since all the properties that we are going to prove should hold for any given ring size
K, we can drop the subscript K to simplify the notation without causing confusion. We let
λ1 (β) and λ2 (β) denote λ
in
K (β) and λ
out
K (β) respectively. The first-order conditions of (I
′)
and (II ′) lead to:
(1)
(N −K) f (λ2 (β))
F (λ2 (β))
× λ′2 (β) =
1
λ1 (β)− β
(2)
(N −K − 1) f (λ2 (β))
F (λ2 (β))
× λ′2 (β) +
Kf (λ1 (β))
F (λ1 (β))
× λ′1 (β) =
1
λ2 (β)− β
We will first show λ1 (β) > λ2 (β) holds in a neighborhood of β
∗. Substituting β = β∗ into
equation (1) and (2), we obtain:
(3)
(N −K) f (λ2 (β∗))
F (λ2 (β∗))
× λ′2 (β∗) =
1
λ1 (β∗)− β∗
(4)
(N −K − 1) f (λ2 (β∗))
F (λ2 (β∗))
× λ′2 (β∗) +
Kf (λ1 (β
∗))
F (λ1 (β∗))
× λ′1 (β∗) =
1
λ2 (β∗)− β∗
Since λ1 (β
∗) = λ2 (β∗) = v, by combining (3) and (4) we have:
(5)
(N −K) f (λ1 (β∗))
F (λ1 (β∗))
× λ′2 (β∗) =
(N −K − 1) f (λ2 (β∗))
F (λ2 (β∗))
× λ′2 (β∗) +
Kf (λ1 (β
∗))
F (λ1 (β∗))
×
λ
′
1 (β
∗)
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Equation (5) can be reduced to:
(6) Kλ′1 (β
∗) = λ′2 (β
∗)
So for any K > 1, we must have λ
′
1 (β
∗) < λ
′
2 (β
∗), hence there exists a neighborhood of
β∗ where λ1 (β) > λ2 (β) for all β belong to this neighborhood. Suppose λ1 (β) and λ2 (β)
first cross at β
′ ∈ (v, β∗) such that λ1(β′) = λ2(β ′). Then with the continuity of the inverse
bid functions, we must have λ′1 (β
′) > λ′2 (β
′). However, through the same derivation as the
above, we can obtain λ′1 (β
′) < λ′2 (β
′), which is a contradiction. Therefore, λ1 (β) and λ2 (β)
will never cross over the support (v, β∗). Consequently, we must have λ1 (β) > λ2 (β) hold
for all β ∈ (v, β∗), i.e., βin(v) < βout(v) for all v ∈ (v, v).
For Property (c), we can take the limit from both sides of (1) and (2), which yields:
(7) lim
β→ v
¯
(N −K) f (λ2 (β))
F (λ2 (β))
× λ′2 (β) = lim
β→ v
¯
1
λ1 (β)− β
(8) lim
β→ v
¯
(N −K − 1) f (λ2 (β))
F (λ2 (β))
× λ′2 (β) +
Kf (λ1 (β))
F (λ1 (β))
× λ′1 (β) = lim
β→ v
¯
1
λ2 (β)− β
Rearranging (7) and (8) and using L’Hospital’s Rule and the fact that βinK (v) = β
out
K (v) =v,
we can easily obtain λ
′
1(v) = 1 +
1
N −K and λ
′
2(v) = 1 +
1
N − 1. Hence,
dβinK (v)
dv
|v=v =
1− 1
N −K + 1,
dβoutK (v)
dv
|v=v = 1− 1
N
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Again, λ2 (β) denotes the inverse function of β
out
K (v) in this proof. Then the ex ante per
member surplus of a ring with size K < N is:
GK =
1
K
Ev, vK+1,...,vN [(v − βinK (v)) 1βin
K
(v)≥maxj∈{K+1,...N} βoutj (vj)
]
=
∫ v
v
{ [v − β
in
K (v)]× [F (λ2 (βinK (v)))]N−K
K
×Kf(v)[F (v)]K−1}dv
=
∫ v
v
{[v − βinK (v)]× [F (λ2 (βinK (v)))]N−K × f(v)[F (v)]K−1}dv
By Property (b) in Lemma 3, we have βinK (v) < β
out
K (v), which leads to the fact that:
GK <
∫ v
v
{[v − βinK (v)]× [F (λ2 (βoutK (v)))]N−K × f(v)[F (v)]K−1}dv.
The right hand side of the above inequality equals
1
N
∫ v
v
[v − βinK (v)]d[F (v)]N , which is less
than
1
N
∫ v
v
[v− v]d[F (v)]N . Since 1
N
∫ v
v
[v− v]d[F (v)]N is the per member surplus for the all-
inclusive ring assuming that the all-inclusive ring can obtain the object by only submitting v,
we can conclude that the all-inclusive ring maximizes the unconstrained ex ante per member
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surplus. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.
For a deviating member from an all-inclusive ring, she bids βoutN−1(v) to compete a ring
of N − 1 members following the bid function βinN−1(v). The density is f (v) =
1
v
and c.d.f is
F (v) =
v
v
. We use λ1 (β) and λ2 (β) to denote the inverse function of β
in
N−1(v) and β
out
N−1(v)
respectively. Then the first-order conditions for the incentive compatibility of bidding lead
to:
(9)
1
λ2 (β)
× λ′2 (β) =
1
λ1 (β)− β
(10)
(N − 1)
λ1 (β)
× λ′1 (β) =
1
λ2 (β)− β
From Lemma 3, we know that λ1 (0)=λ2 (0)=0 and λ1 (β
∗)=λ2 (β∗)=v¯, where β∗ is the
common terminal point for two bid functions. We now start to show the monotonicity of
λ
′
1 (β) and λ
′
2 (β). Rearrange (9) and (10) as (11) and (12):
(11) λ
′
2 (β)λ1 (β)− λ′2 (β) β = λ2 (β)
(12) λ
′
1 (β)λ2 (β)− λ′1 (β) β =
λ1 (β)
N − 1
Differentiating both sides of (11) and (12), we have:
(13) λ′′2 (β) =
λ
′
2 (β)
(
2− λ′1 (β)
)
λ1 (β)− β
(14) λ′′1 (β) =
λ
′
1 (β)
(
1 +
1
N − 1 − λ
′
2 (β)
)
λ2 (β)− β
From Lemma 3, we know that λ
′
1 (0) = 2, λ
′
2 (0) = 1 +
1
N − 1 and λ1 (β) > λ2 (β) . Also
λ1 (β) > β and λ2 (β) > β. Suppose λ
′
1 (ε) ≥ 2 for a small increment ε from 0. We have
λ′′2 (ε) ≤ 0 from (13), so λ′2 (ε) ≤ 1+
1
N − 1 , which implies that λ
′′
1 (ε) ≥ 0 from (14). Iterating
this law of motion for each small increment starting from 0 makes it impossible for λ1 (β)
and λ2 (β) to meet at a common terminal point. So we must have λ
′
1 (ε) < 2, which implies
λ
′′
1 (ε) < 0 and λ
′′
2 (ε) > 0. This initial condition combined with the law of motion defined in
equation (13) and (14) gives us the fact that λ
′′
1 (β) < 0 and λ
′′
2 (β) > 0 for all β ∈ (0, β∗].
Consequently, λ1 (β) always lies above the line joining the origin and the common terminal
bid at the valuation v. Then λ1 (β) >
v
β∗
β is immediate. We next look for β∗. Notice
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that (9) and (10) are the same system as (2) and (3) in Marshall et al (1994) except the
terminal condition. Follow the same calculation in Appendix A in Marshall et al (1994),
we can obtain β∗ in our setting, which equals v
(
1− C 1N−2
)
where C =
NN
22N−2(N − 1)N−1 .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Again, we use λ1 (β) to denote the inverse function of β
in
N−1(v). The per member surplus
for an all-inclusive ring when the total number of bidders is N is
∫ v
0
v[F (v)]N−1f (v) dv =
v
N + 1
. The corresponding deviation profit is DN , which equals:∫ v
0
[v−βoutN−1 (v)]×[F (λ1
(
βoutN−1(v)
)
)]N−1f(v)dv. Since βoutN−1 (v) is the best response to β
in
N−1 (v),
we must have [v−βoutN−1 (v)]× [F (λ1
(
βoutN−1(v)
)
)]N−1 > [v−(1− 1
N
)v]× [F (λ1((1− 1
N
)v))]N−1
when we replace βoutN−1 (v) with its upper bound (1 −
1
N
)v in the bidder’s payoff function.
Also, we have λ1 (β) >
v
β∗
β from Lemma 4, then we can obtain a lower bound for the
deviation profit by replacing λ1 (β) with
v¯
β∗
β. Notice that
[v− (1− 1
N
)v]× [F (λ1((1− 1
N
)v))]N−1 > [v− (1− 1
N
)v]× [F ( v
β∗
((1− 1
N
)v))]N−1. Therefore,
we have DN >
∫ v
0
[v − (1− 1
N
)v]× [F ( v
β∗
(1− 1
N
)v))]N−1f(v)dv =
(N − 1)N−1 vN
NN (N + 1) β∗N−1
.
A sufficient condition for DN > GN is that
(N − 1)N−1 vN
NN (N + 1) β∗N−1
>
v
N + 1
. Substitut-
ing the expression for β∗ into the left hand side of the inequality and rearrange, we need
(N − 1)N−1
NN
(
1− C 1N−2
)N−1 > 1. As 1 − C 1N−2 < 1, the left hand side will increase dramatically
as N gets large. Substituting the expression for C into the left hand side of the inequal-
ity, we need
(N − 1)N−1
NN [1− ( N
N
22N−2 (N − 1)N−1 )
1
N−2 ]N−1
> 1. Let α =
NN
22N−2(N − 1)N−1 . It is
easy to show that
dα
dN
< 0 when N > 1. So α
1
N−2 decreases with the increase of N. Also,
lim
N→+∞
α
1
N−2 =
1
4
. Then 1 − α 1N−2 monotonically converges to 3
4
from below. Therefore,
(N − 1)N−1
NN
(
1− α 1N−2
)N−1 > (N − 1)N−1
NN(
3
4
)N−1
. The term
(N − 1)N−1
NN(
3
4
)N−1
is monotonically increasing when
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N > 4 and bigger than 1 when N > 13. That means
(N − 1)N−1
NN
(
1− α 1N−2
)N−1 is bigger than 1
at N ≤ 13. We can evaluate (N − 1)
N−1
NN
(
1− α 1N−2
)N−1 up to N = 13 and easily see that when
N ≥ 10, the all-inclusive ring will not be stable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We use λ2 (β) to denote the inverse function of β
out
K (v). From the proof of Propo-
sition 1, we know that the per member surplus of a ring with K members is: GK =∫ v
v
{[v−βinK (v)]×[F (λ2 (βinK (v)))]N−K×f(v)[F (v)]K−1}dv, which equals:
1
vN
∫ v
0
{[v−βinK (v)]×
[λ2 (β
in
K (v))]
N−K × vK−1}dv for the uniform distribution on the support [0, v]. Use G1 to de-
note the surplus for each bidder under the noncooperative bidding, then G1 =
1
vN
∫ v
0
{[v −
(
N − 1
N
v)]×vN−1}dv. As βinK (v) is the best response to βoutK (v), we must have [v−βinK (v)]×
[λ2 (β
in
K (v))]
N−K > [v−(N − 1
N
v)]× [λ2(N − 1
N
v)]N−K when replacing βinK (v) with
N
N − 1v in
the bidder’s payoff function. So if we can show that λ2 (β) >
N
N − 1β, we can immediately
obtain GK > G1 for K ≥ 2. Again, we have the system of differential equations for the
uniform distribution with the ring size K ≥ 2:
(15)
N −K
λ2 (β)
× λ′2 (β) =
1
λ1 (β)− β
(16)
(N −K − 1)
λ2(β)
× λ′2 (β) +
K
λ1 (β)
× λ′1 (β) =
1
λ2 (β)− β
From Lemma 3, we know that λ
′
1(0) = 1 +
1
N −K and λ
′
2(0) = 1 +
1
N − 1. Now we are
ready to show λ2 (β) >
N
N − 1β, which consists of the following two steps.
Step 1. We will show that for a small increment ε from 0, λ
′
1 (ε) ≤ 1 +
1
N −K . Let us
prove by contradiction and suppose that λ
′
1 (ε) > 1 +
1
N −K . Similar as in the proof of
Lemma 4, we can obtain λ′′2 (β) =
λ′2 (β)
(
1 +
1
N −K − λ
′
1 (β)
)
λ1 (β)− β from (15). Then λ
′′
2 (ε) < 0,
which implies that λ2 (ε) < (1+
1
N − 1)ε. So
1
λ2 (ε)− ε >
N − 1
ε
. Combine (15) and (16), we
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can derive that:
(N −K − 1)
(N −K) ×
1
λ1 (ε)− ε+
K
λ1 (ε)
×λ′1 (ε) >
N − 1
ε
. This inequality together
with the fact that
λ1 (ε)
ε
= λ′1 (ε) when ε is sufficiently small, gives us λ
′
1 (ε) < 1 +
1
N −K ,
which is a contradiction to our hypothesis. So we must have λ
′
1 (ε) ≤ 1 +
1
N −K and
λ′′2 (ε) ≥ 0.
Step 2. We will show that for all β ∈ (0, β∗K), if
λ1 (β)
β
≤ 1 + 1
N −K and
λ2 (β)
β
≥
1 +
1
N − 1 , then λ
′
1 (β) ≤ 1 +
1
N −K . This assertion is proved as follows. Merge (15) with
(16), we obtain
(17) λ′1 (β) =
1
K
[
λ1 (β)
β
λ2 (β)
β
− 1
−
λ1 (β)
β
λ1 (β)
β
− 1
× N −K − 1
N −K ]
If
λ1 (β)
β
≤ 1 + 1
N −K and
λ2 (β)
β
≥ 1 + 1
N − 1 , then it is immediate that:
λ′1 (β) ≤
1
K
[
1 +
1
N −K
1 +
1
N − 1 − 1
−
1 +
1
N −K
1 +
1
N −K − 1
× N −K − 1
N −K ] = 1 +
1
N −K by replacing
λ1 (β)
β
and
λ2 (β)
β
with their upper and lower bound respectively in equation (17).
The result in step 1 gives the initial condition and the one in step 2 stipulates the law of
motion of bids. Combining these two steps and the fact that both bid functions meet at the
same ending point, we must have λ′′2 (β) > 0 for all β ∈ (0, β∗K). So we obtain the desired
result λ2 (β) >
N
N − 1β. Q.E.D.
Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 1.
Given bidder 1 follows and believes her rival also follows the equilibrium strategy, if
bidder 2 mimics the valuation other than her own, she does not gain in the first round. In
the second round, bidder 1 still bids her valuation, which is optimal even though the inferred
valuation from bidder 2 is wrong because bidding one’s own valuation in a single second-price
auction is an ex post equilibrium. So the optimal response for bidder 2 at the second stage is
to still bid her own valuation. Then there is nothing to gain for bidder 2 to mimic the other
valuation at the first stage, which leads to the conclusion that in equilibrium both bidders
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will bid their own valuations. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The existence proof consists of two standard steps. The first step produces the equilib-
rium candidate and the second step verifies that the candidate is indeed an equilibrium.
Step 1. Producing the equilibrium candidate. We start from the second stage. Let us
assume that a bidder observes a valuation v and submit a bid β (z) at the first stage, i.e.,
she mimics z type, while the other bidder follows the specified strategy truthfully. Let λ(β),
λ1(β) and λ2(β) denote the inverse functions of β (v) , β1 (v) and β2 (v) respectively.
If the bidder loses at the bid β (z), then she bids β2 (m), i.e., she mimics type m at
the second stage, and her rival will bid β1 (vˆ). The losing bidder believes that vˆ is in (z, 1]
with density
f (vˆ)
1− F (z) . So the second-stage expected payoff for the first-stage losing bidder
who mimics type m is pi2 = (v − β2 (m)) Pr(β2 (m) > β1 (vˆ)). Pr(β2 (m) > β1 (vˆ)) is the
probability of winning at the second stage for the first-stage losing bidder. In our case,
Pr(β2 (m) > β1 (vˆ)) =
F [β−11 (β2 (m))]− F (z)
1− F (z) . In a standard auction environment, this
probability is only a function of the current stage bid, while here the probability is also
parameterized by her previous stage bid.
If the bidder wins at the bid β (z), then she bids β1 (n) , i.e., she mimics type n, and her
rival will bid β2 (vˆ), where the winning bidder believes that vˆ is in [0, z) with density
f (vˆ)
F (z)
.
So the second-stage expected payoff for the first-stage winning bidder who mimics type n is
pi1 = (v− β1 (n)) Pr(β1 (n) > β2 (vˆ)). Pr(β1 (n) > β2 (vˆ)) is the probability of winning at the
second stage for the first-stage winning bidder. Here Pr(β1 (n) > β2 (vˆ)) =
F [β−12 (β1 (n))]
F (z)
.
We then start to consider the first-period bid function. The first-period bid function has
to balance the second-period payoff. Since we have assumed that the bidder mimics type z
at the first stage, her overall expected payoff for two stages is:
pi (v) = F (z)[(v − β(z)) + δpi1] + (1− F (z))[δpi2]
= F (z){(v − β(z)) + δ[(v − β1 (n))F [β
−1
2 (β1 (n))]
F (z)
]}
+ (1− F (z))[δ(v − β2 (m))F [β
−1
1 (β2 (m))]− F (z)
1− F (z) ]
= F (z)(v − β(z)) + δ(v − β1 (n))F [β−12 (β1 (n))] + δ(v − β2 (m))[F [β−11 (β2 (m))]− F (z)]
The optimality of the symmetric bid functions requires that truthful bidding is optimal for
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all three bid functions simultaneously. Then we can use the following conventional method:
The first-order condition of z is:
(1) f (z) v − f (z) β(z)− F (z) β ′(z)− δf (z) (v − β2 (m)) = 0
The first-order condition of m is:
(2) (v − β2 (m))β−1
′
1 (β2 (m)) f [β
−1
1 (β2 (m))]− {F [β−11 (β2 (m))]− F (z)} = 0
The first-order condition of n is:
(3) (v − β1 (n))β−1
′
2 (β1 (n)) f [β
−1
2 (β1 (n))]− F [β−12 (β1 (n))] = 0
Since the truthful bidding is the equilibrium solution to the above three equations, we replace
m, n and z with v. Then (2) and (3) become:
(4) (v − β2 (v))β−1
′
1 (β2 (v)) f [β
−1
1 (β2 (v))]− {F [β−11 (β2 (v))]− F (v)} = 0
(5) (v − β1 (v))β−1
′
2 (β1 (v)) f [β
−1
2 (β1 (v))]− F [β−12 (β1 (v))] = 0
Let λ(β), λ1(β) and λ2(β) denote the inverse functions of β (v) , β1 (v) and β2 (v) respectively.
The equations (4) and (5) can be transformed into:
(6) (λ2 (t)− t)λ′1 (t) f (λ1 (t)) = F [λ1 (t)]− F [λ2 (t)]
(7) (λ1 (t)− t)λ′2 (t) f (λ2 (t)) = F [λ2 (t)]
The equilibrium boundary conditions must be λ1 (0) = λ2 (0) = 0 and λ1 (1) = λ2 (1) = t
∗
as usual, where t∗ is the common terminal bid when a bidder observes the valuation 1.
Theorem 1 in Landsberger et al (2001) gives the existence result of a monotonic solution to
the system (6) and (7). The first-stage bid function can be directly solved from the equation
transformed from equation (1) by imposing the equilibrium condition, i.e., replacing z and m
with v. Let y and y′ denote β(v) and β′(v) respectively. Then the transformed equation can
be rewritten as: y′ = − f (v)
F (v)
y+
f (v) v
F (v)
− δf (v) v
F (v)
+
δf (v)
F (v)
β2 (v). This is a nonhomogeneous
first-order linear differential equation. Given the boundary condition β (0) = 0, the unique
solution is:
1
F (v)
∫ v
0
[f (t) t − δf (t) t + δf (t) β2 (t)]dt. It is easy to check that β′(v) =
f (v)
∫ v
0
F (t) (1− δ + β′2 (t))dt
F 2 (v)
. Given the fact that β′2 (t) > 0 as we have obtained above,
β′(v) > 0 is immediate.
Step 2. Verifying the equilibrium. Since the three bid functions produced above are
all monotonic, the application of the standard verification approach, i.e., to show that all
other mimicking types will lead to less payoff, is straight forward. So we forgo its detailed
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derivation here. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Under the assumption that f(v) = 1, the differential equation system (6) and (7) can be
transformed into:
(8) (λ2 (t)− t)λ′1 (t) = λ1 (t)− λ2 (t)
(9) (λ1 (t)− t)λ′2 (t) = λ2 (t)
Property a) is just the standard boundary conditions. The following graph helps us to see
the proof for the rest of the properties.
Figure 1. Bounds of Inverse Bid Functions
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In the above figure, from the left to the right, the three lines are 2t,
t
t∗
and
4t
3
respectively.
We need to show that λ1(t) and λ2(t) behave regularly within the regions between 2t and
t
t∗
,
t
t∗
and
4t
3
respectively. Property b) and c) are proved by ruling out all other possibilities
by contradiction, which is a tedious process. First, we can easily show that λ
′
1 (0) = 2 and
λ
′
2 (0) =
4
3
. Second, we can show that λ
′
1 (t
∗) = 0 and λ
′
2 (t
∗) =
1
1− t∗ . Third, differentiate
both sides of equation (9), we have λ
′
1 (t)λ
′
2 (t) + (λ1 (t)− t)λ′′2 (t) = 2λ′2 (t), i.e., λ′′2 (t) =
2λ
′
2 (t)− λ′1 (t)λ′2 (t)
λ1 (t)− t . As λ1 (t)−t > 0, we can obtain the following relations: (i) If λ
′
1 (t) < 2,
then λ
′′
2 (t) > 0. (ii) If λ
′
1 (t) > 2, then λ
′′
2 (t) < 0. The above results prepare us to show the
bounds for λ1 (t) and λ2 (t) with the following steps.
A. Suppose λ1 (t) lies entirely above the line 2t. Notice that λ
′
1 (0) = 2 and λ
′
1 (t
∗) = 0,
53
which combined with the fact that λ1 (t) lies entirely above 2v implies that λ
′
1 (t) must have
first increased above two and then decreased to zero. Given the smoothness of λ1 (t) , this
means that there exists at least a t > 0 such that λ
′
1 (t) = 2. Let t¯ be the inf of the set of
such t . Then λ
′
1 (t¯) > 2 for all t < t¯. By relation (ii) , we must have λ
′′
2 (t¯) = 0 and λ
′′
2 (t) < 0
for all t < t¯. Then from equation (8), we can obtain the equation 3λ2 (t¯) = λ1 (t¯) + 2t¯.
From equation (9), we have the equation (λ1 (t¯) − t¯)λ′2 (t¯) = λ2 (t¯) . Combining these two
equations, we obtain 3(λ2 (t¯) − t¯)λ′2 (t¯) = λ2 (t¯) . Notice that λ′2 (t¯) <
4
3
because λ′2 (0) =
4
3
and λ
′′
2 (t) < 0 for all t < t¯. Then λ2 (t¯) <
4
3
× 3(λ2 (t¯) − t¯). So we must have λ2 (t¯)
t¯
>
4
3
,
which is a contradiction to the fact that until t¯, λ2 (t) still lies below the line
4
3
t. So λ1 (t)
can not lie entirely above 2t.
B. Suppose λ1 (t) crosses 2t from above first. Suppose the crossing happens at the point
tˆ, where tˆ > 0 and λ′1(tˆ) < 2. Again there exists a t¯ such that 0 < t¯ < tˆ and λ
′′
1 (t¯) = 2 and
λ
′
1 (t¯) > 2 for all t < t¯. The above argument can be applied in exactly the same way here.
So we can rule out this case too.
C. Suppose λ1 (t) crosses 2t from below first at t¯ > 0. Then λ
′
1 (t¯) > 2 and λ1 (t¯) = 2t¯.
From the equation (8), we have (λ2 (t¯)− t¯)λ′1 (t¯) = 2t¯− λ2 (t¯). So we must have
λ2 (t¯)
t¯
<
4
3
,
i.e., λ2 (t) goes below
4
3
t at the point t¯. As λ′1 (t) must first decrease below 2, λ
′
2 (t) will
first increase above
4
3
from relation (i) . Then, there must exist a tˆ < t¯ such that λ2 (t)
crosses the line
4
3
t from the above at the point tˆ. So λ′2
(
tˆ
)
<
4
3
. From equation (9), we have(
λ1
(
tˆ
)− tˆ)λ′2 (tˆ) = 43 tˆ. So we obtain λ1
(
tˆ
)
tˆ
> 2, which is a contradiction to the fact that
λ1 (t) lies low the line 2t until t¯. So this case is also impossible. To sum up the step A to C,
we show that 2t > λ1 (t) .
D. It is easy to obtain λ1 (t) > λ2 (t) and their monotonicity from the differential equation
system (8) and (9).
E. Suppose λ1 (t) lies entirely under 2t and crosses
4
3
t from above. Then λ′2 (t) must
rise above
4
3
first and λ2 (t) must cross
4
3
t from above at least once due to relation (i).
Let the crossing happen at t¯. So λ′2 (t¯) <
4
3
and λ2 (t¯) =
4
3
t¯. From equation (9), we have
(λ1 (t¯)− t)λ′2 (t¯) =
4
3
t¯. Then we can obtain
λ1 (t¯)
t¯
> 2, which contradicts the fact that λ1 (t)
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lies entirely under 2t. So λ1 (t) must lie above the line
3
4
t.
F. Suppose λ2 (t) crosses
4
3
t at least once. Since 2t > λ1 (t), there exits a neighborhood
around zero such that λ′1 (t) < 2 for all t belong to this neighborhood. Then λ
′′
2 (t) > 0 in
this neighborhood from relation (i). Suppose the inf of the set of all crossing points of
4
3
t
is t¯, where t¯ > 0 and λ′2 (t¯) <
4
3
. From equation (9), we have (λ1 (t¯)− t¯)λ′2 (t¯) =
4
3
t¯. So we
obtain
λ1 (t¯)
t¯
> 2, which is a contradiction to our obtained conclusion at the end of step C
that 2t > λ1 (t). Then λ2 (t) must lie entirely above
4
3
t.
G. Actually, the essence of the above argument can be used to show that λ′′2 (t) > 0.
Suppose not, then there must exist a line αt (2 > α >
3
4
) from the origin cutting λ2 (t)
from below at such a t¯, where t¯ > 0 and λ′2 (t¯) < α. Again from equation (9), we have
(λ1 (t¯)− t¯)λ′2 (t¯) = αt¯. So we obtain
λ1 (t¯)
t¯
> 2, which is a contradiction.
H. Similarly, suppose λ′′1 (t) < 0 does not hold, then there must exist a line αt (2 > α >
3
4
) from the origin cutting λ2 (t) from above at such a t¯, where t¯ > 0 and λ
′
1 (t¯) > α. From
equation (8), we have (λ2 (t¯)− t¯)λ′1 (t¯) = αt¯ − λ2 (t¯) , which gives us
λ2 (t¯)
t¯
<
4
3
. This is a
contradiction. So λ′′1 (t) > 0.
I. Since λ′′1 (t) > 0 and λ
′′
2 (t) < 0, the result that
t
t∗
separating λ1 (t) and λ2 (t) is
immediate.
J. To sum up all the above steps, we prove property b) and c).
As to Property e), by replacing f(v) with 1 and F (v) with v in the general formula of
β(v) derived in the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain the unique solution:
β(v) =
1
v
∫ v
0
(t− δt+ δβ2 (t))dt = v
2
(1− δ) + δ
v
∫ v
0
β2 (t) dt. Using the fact that
3
4
v > β2 (v) ,
it is easy to see that β (v) is smaller than
1
2
v, where
1
2
v is the equilibrium bid function for
a single auction.
Finally, we show Property d). Its upper bound is shown as follows. At the valuation
1, the second-stage equilibrium payoff for the bidder is 1 − t∗. Given bidders bid truthfully
in the first stage, it is necessary for the second-stage bid function to prevent any second-
stage deviation. Let the second-stage payoff pi = (1− b)λ2 (b), where b is the choice of the
bid. Then pi ≤ 1 − t∗ for all b ∈ [0, 1]. Notice that pi > (1− b) 4
3
b because of the fact that
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λ2 (b) >
4
3
b and max (1− b) 4
3
b =
1
3
when b =
1
2
, so we must have
1
3
≤ 1 − t∗, i.e. t∗ ≤ 2
3
.
The lower bound of t∗ will be derived in the step B in the proof of Lemma 2 later. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.
A. We start with the second-stage bid functions by assuming both bidders follow the
same pure strategy bid function at the first stage. We will use bidder 1 to denote the generic
bidder for our derivation of the equilibrium bid functions. If bidder 1 wins at the valuation
v, then she randomly chooses a bid b on the support (t∗, t∗] with p.d.f. gv (b) and c.d.f. Gv (b).
Her rival will bid according to βv2 (vˆ), where vˆ is the first-stage loser’s valuation and the win-
ner believes that vˆ is in [0, v) with density
1
v
. The optimality of the randomization requires
(v − b) Pr(b > βv2 (vˆ)) to be a constant Kv for all b ∈ (r∗, r∗). Let λv2 (vˆ) = βv−12 (vˆ). We have
Pr(b > βv2 (vˆ)) =
βv
−1
2 (b)
v
=
λv2 (b)
v
and (v − b) Pr(b > βv2 (vˆ)) = (v − b)
λv2 (b)
v
. Hence we
need that:
(10) (v − b) λ
v
2 (b)
v
= Kv
The optimality of bidder 1’s rival’s strategy requires that: βv2 (vˆ) = argmax
bˆ
(
vˆ − bˆ
)
Pr
(
bˆ > b
)
for all vˆ ∈ [0, v). Let t = βv2 (vˆ). Since Pr(bˆ > b) = F v(t), the above expression can be rewrit-
ten as t = argmax (vˆ − t)Gv (t) for all vˆ ∈ [0, v). The first-order condition leads to:
(11) (λv2 (t)− t) f v (t) = F v (t)
It is almost the same asymmetric auction case examined by Vickrey (1961). It is easy
to check that both bidders should have the same ending (maximum) bid. Let the ending
bid be t∗. From equation (10), we obtain λv2 (b) =
vKv
v − b . By symmetry, this implies that
the bid function for bidder 1’s rival is βv2 (vˆ) = v −
vKv
vˆ
. Notice that βv2 (K
v) = 0. So
in order to obtain a monotonic bid function, we assume that when vˆ ∈ [0, Kv), bidder
1’s rival will not bid at all. Similarly, λv2 (t
∗) = v, so
vKv
v − t∗ = v, then t
∗ = v − Kv.
We adopt the stability refinement argument by Vickrey (1961) and choose the particular
equilibrium where λv2 (b) =
vKv
v − b is tangent to the 45 degree line. This implies that K
v =
v
4
.
So t∗ =
3v
4
and λv2 (b) =
v2
4(v − b) and β
v
2 (vˆ) = v −
v2
4vˆ
. Substitute the functional form
of λv2 (.) into equation (11), we have
gv (t)
Gv (t)
=
4(v − t)
(v − 2t)2 . Integration on both sides leads
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to: lnGv (t) = − ln (2t− v) − v
2t− v + C. For all values of C, we have G
v (t) → 0 when
t → v
2
. So
v
2
is the lower bound of the support of the randomized bids. Also Gv (t∗) = 1,
i.e., lnGv (t∗) = 0, so − ln(2 × 3v
4
− v) − v
2× 3v
4
− v
+ C = 0. Then C = ln v + 2 − ln 2.
So Gv (t) =
v
2 (2t− v)e
4t− 3v
2t− v . We have shown that when vˆ ∈ [0, Kv), bidder 1’s rival will
not bid. Since we find that Kv =
v
4
and bidder 1 will randomize on the support (
v
2
,
3v
4
], we
can see that bidder 1’s rival will not win at all when vˆ ∈ [ Kv, v
2
) either. With the bidder
symmetry, by now we have found the second-stage bid functions.
B. Now we start to derive the first-stage bid function. Given a valuation v, bidder 1
bids β (z) where z > v. So we first consider the situation when bidder 1 mimics a higher
type and the other bidder truthfully follows β (.). Then she wins with probability z and
loses with probability 1− z. If bidder 1 wins, at the second stage, she believes that her rival
has the valuation vˆ distributed on [0, z) with density
1
z
. Her rival believes that she faces a
first-stage winner with valuation z, hence if i) vˆ ∈ [0, z
4
), then she will not submit a bid.
ii) if vˆ ∈ [z
4
, z), then she will bid according to the bid function βz2 (vˆ) = z −
z2
4vˆ
. Then
the second-stage best response for the first-stage winner given she mimics type z will be to
submit a bid b satisfying the following conditions. If b = 0, then her second-stage payoff is
v
4
. If she submits a nonzero bid, her payoff is (v − b) Pr (b > βz2 (vˆ)) , which equals
(v − b) z
4 (z − b) .
This term is maximized by choosing b = 0. In this case, her second-stage best payoff is
again
v
4
. So we can see that under all instances, if bidder 1 mimics z at the first stage and
wins, she can get
v
4
at most in the second stage given the other bidder follows the specified
equilibrium strategy. Now consider what if bidder 1 loses the first stage by mimicking type
z. She knows exactly her rival’s valuation vˆ, where v < z < vˆ. Her rival will randomly choose
a bid b from the interval (
vˆ
2
,
3vˆ
4
] according to the c.d.f. Gvˆ (b) =
vˆ
2 (2b− vˆ)e
4b− 3vˆ
2b− vˆ . Then
the best response for the bidder will be i) if v ∈ [0, vˆ
4
), then she will not submit a bid. ii)
if v ∈ [ vˆ
4
, vˆ), then she will bid according to the bid function β vˆ2 (v) = vˆ −
vˆ2
4v
. Next we need
to determine the appropriate integration regions for payoff functions under different values
of v. First, if v <
z
2
, she will obtain zero second-stage payoff when she loses the first stage
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according to the stated strategies. Then we can be sure that she never needs to mimic such
a z that v <
z
2
because a) it does not bring her any higher second-stage payoff following
winning the first stage due to the fact that a bidder can always obtain
v
4
at the second stage
given winning the first stage no matter what z she mimics and b) it does not bring her any
higher second-stage payoff following losing the first stage either since other mimicking type
can always bring her nonnegative second-stage payoff. Second, when
1
2
> v >
z
2
, she will
not bid when vˆ ∈ (2v, 1] and bid vˆ − vˆ
2
4v
when vˆ ∈ (z, 2v]. So her second-stage payoff when
vˆ ∈ (z, 2v] is [v− (vˆ− vˆ
2
4v
)] Pr(vˆ− vˆ
2
4v
> b). Pr(vˆ− vˆ
2
4v
> b) = F vˆ(vˆ− vˆ
2
4v
) =
v
2v − vˆ e
2v − 2vˆ
2v − vˆ .
Then [v − (vˆ − vˆ
2
4v
)] Pr(vˆ − vˆ
2
4v
> b) =
2v − vˆ
4
e
2v − 2vˆ
2v − vˆ . So her overall expected second-
stage payoff following she losing the first stage is pi1 (v, z) =
∫ 2v
z
(
2v − vˆ
4
e
2v − 2vˆ
2v − vˆ × 1
1− z )dvˆ.
Finally, in the case where
1
2
< v, her overall expected second-stage payoff following losing
the first stage is piz (v, z) =
∫ 1
z
(
2v − vˆ
4
e
2v − 2vˆ
2v − vˆ × 1
1− z )dvˆ. Notice that if we can find a
first-stage bid function to implement truthful bidding, i.e. z = v, then at v =
1
2
, we will
have pi1(
1
2
) = pi2(
1
2
) and pi
′
1(
1
2
) = pi
′
2(
1
2
) according to the above derived expressions of pi1(.)
and pi2(.), which ensures the continuity of the first-stage bid function at v =
1
2
. Now we are
ready to derive the first-stage bid function. The bidder’s first-stage payoff if she observes a
valuation v while mimics z > v when the other bidder follows the equilibrium bid functions
is:
i) v ≤ 1
2
Π1 (v, z)
= z[(v − β(z)) + δ v
4
] + (1− z) [δpi1 (v, z)]
= z[(v − β(z)) + δ v
4
] + (1− z) [δ ∫ 2v
z
(
2v − vˆ
4
e
2v − 2vˆ
2v − vˆ × 1
1− z )dvˆ]
= z[(v − β(z)) + δ v
4
] + δ
∫ 2v
z
(
2v − vˆ
4
e
2v − 2vˆ
2v − vˆ )dvˆ
= z[(v − β(z)) + δ v
4
]− δ ∫ z
2v
(
2v − vˆ
4
e
2v − 2vˆ
2v − vˆ )dvˆ
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The first-order condition w.r.t. z yields:
(12) v − β(z)− zβ ′(z) + 1
4
δv − δ2v − z
4
e
2v − 2z
2v − z = 0
In equilibrium z = v, so we can have:
(13) v − β(v)− vβ ′(v) = 0
The unique solution is β(v) =
1
2
v.
ii) v >
1
2
Π1 (v, z) = z[(v − β(z)) + δ v
4
] + (1− z) [δpi2 (v, z)] and we can obtain the same bid function.
The above is the solution when the bidder mimics a type bigger than her own valuation.
Also, we need to check when the bidder mimics a lower type whether the bid function still
remains the same. It is easy to check that it is indeed the case. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Let I1 (0) denote the inf of the randomized bids for type zero at the first stage where the
subscript represents the number of the stage. We know that I1 (v) > I1 (0) for all v > 0 from
the monotonicity requirement. Once the zero type bids I1 (0) in the first stage, she will lose
with probability one and her zero valuation can be inferred with probability one too. Under
this contingency, we have a subsequent second-stage auction where type zero competes with
the type uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. In this subgame, suppose first that the zero type
randomizes over zero. Let S2 (0) > 0 denote the sup of her randomized bids at the second
stage. We claim that this zero type must be defeated with probability one. Otherwise, the
zero type will win with positive probability bringing her negative payoff, which is impossible
in equilibrium. Therefore, all her rival’s bids must be above S2 (0). However, this will not be
optimal for those of her rivals whose types fall in the interval [0, S2 (0)] since these types will
obtain negative payoff with probability one in this particular subgame. Hence we obtain that
the zero type can not randomizes above zero at the second stage. Then suppose S2 (0) < 0,
the zero type’s rivals can always win with negative bids, which is impossible for any normal
auction rule. So finally we consider the only case left where S2 (0) = 0. In this case, we can
argue that the zero type must be defeated with probability one as before. Then any of type
zero’s rivals who has a valuation v > 0 must bid above zero. But this makes the optimal bid
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non-existent because whenever the bidder bids b > 0, it is always better for her to bid
b
2
. So
no equilibrium can exist in the subgame. Then we can conclude that there is no symmetric
monotonic equilibrium for the whole two-stage first-price auctions with the announcement
of the first-stage losing bid game. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1.
The equilibrium will be derived in the following step A and B, which at the same time
yields the necessary equilibrium condition.
A. To support the second-stage equilibrium, we need to show that k ≤ 1
2
. The loser
definitely does not want to deviate. We need to further show that the winner does not
want to decrease the bid. If the winner decrease the bid by ε > 0, her second-stage payoff
will be pi = (vˆ − ((1− k) v + kvˆ − ε)) (1− k) v + kvˆ − ε− v
(1− k) v + kvˆ − v , where
(1− k) v + kvˆ − ε− v
(1− k) v + kvˆ − v
is the probability of winning. We need
dpi
dε
≤ 0. So we have (vˆ− v) (2k − 1) ≤ 2ε. Since this
inequality needs to hold no matter how small ε is, we then need k ≤ 1
2
.
B. To support the first-stage equilibrium, we need to show that k ≥ δ
1 + δ
. To show
this, we have to derive the first-stage bid functions first. Let us assume bidder 1 observes
a valuation v while mimics z < v. Then her first-stage payoff is z (v − β (z)). Conditional
on bidder 1 wins the first stage, her rival will have valuation t uniform over [0, z) with
density
1
z
and randomize over [t, (1− k) t + kz). It is easy to check that the best response
for bidder 1 will be to bid (1− k) t + kz to win the object for sure. Then her payoff is∫ z
0
[v − ((1− k) t+ kz)]1
z
dt = v − z
2
− kz
2
. Conditional on bidder 1 loses the first stage, her
rival will have valuation t uniform over [z, 1) with density
1
1− z and bid (1− k) z+kt. Then
bidder 1’s best response will be to bid (1− k) z + kt + ε as long as (1− k) z + kt < v. The
deviation of z will be analyzed in the following two categories.
First, we consider a z deviation such that (1− k) z + kt > v when t = 1, i.e., z ∈
(
v − k
1− k , v), which represents a small deviation as bidder 1’s rival may bid above v for some
realizations of t. We assume bidder 1 can win the object only with (1− k) z+kt at the second
stage. If we can obtain an equilibrium under this assumption, the equilibrium will still remain
valid under such assumption as bidder 1 needs to win with (1− k) z + kt + ε. Notice that
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bidder 1 will only bid when (1− k) z + kt < v, which implies that t < v − (1− k) z
k
. So her
second-stage payoff is
∫ v−(1−k)z
k
z
[v − ((1− k) z + kt)] 1
1− zdt =
(v − z)2
2k
1
1− z .
Then her overall two-stage expected payoff is:
pi = z (v − β (z)) + δz(v − z
2
− kz
2
) + δ (1− z) (v − z)
2
2k (1− z)
= zv − zβ (z) + δ(zv − z
2
2
− kz
2
2
) + δ
(v − z)2
2k
Differentiate pi w.r.t. z and set the first-order condition to zero, we obtain:
(14) v − zβ′ (z)− β (z) + δ(v − z − kz)− δ (v − z)
k
= 0
In equilibrium, z = v, so we have v − vβ′ (v) − β (v) − δkv = 0. With usual boundary
condition β (0) = 0, we have β (v) =
(1− δk)v
2
.
Second, we then require the above derived bid functions can also prevent a large z
deviation such that (1− k) z + kt ≤ v when t = 1, i.e., z ∈ [0, v − k
1− k ] where bidder 1’s
rival will always bid under or equal to v. Following the above specified strategy and truthful
bidding, a bidder’s total payoff is
v2
2
+
δv2
2
, whose derivation is in the proof of Lemma 4.
We next will show that bidder 1 will not deviate to zero at the first stage, which requires
that the deviation profit δ
∫ 1
0
(v − kt)dt ≤ v
2
2
+
δv2
2
. This inequality can be rearranged
as (v − δ
1 + δ
)2 − ( δ
1 + δ
)2 +
δk
1 + δ
≥ 0 for all v including v = δ
1 + δ
. Hence we must
have k ≥ δ
1 + δ
. We then need to show that under the condition k ≥ δ
1 + δ
, all other big
deviations can be prevented too. The total deviation profit is:
pi = (zv− (1− δk) z
2
)+(δzv−z
2
2
−kz
2
2
)+δ (1− z) ∫ 1
z
(v−(1− k) z−kt) 1
1− zdt. Setting
dpi
dz
=
0, we find the best z deviation is
v + δk − δ
1 + δk − δ . While, we can check that this best deviation
fails the large deviation constraint (1− k) z + k < v. This means that pi is monotonic in z
for all z ∈ [0, v − k
1− k ]. It is straight forward to check that when z =
v − k
1− k , the deviation
profit pi is smaller than the profit from truthful bidding. Therefore all large deviations can
be prevented. Similarly, we can analyze the situation where bidder 1 mimics a type z > v in
the first stage, which yields the same equilibrium bid functions and equilibrium conditions.
So we can conclude that the necessary condition for the above derived bid functions to be
an equilibrium is
1
2
≥ k ≥ δ
1 + δ
. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 6.
It is straight forward to check that the derived bid functions in Lemma 1 constitute an
equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.
The proof consists of the following three steps.
A. We need to find an appropriate expression for the revenue. The expected payment
for one bidder in the first stage is
∫ 1
0
[
v2
2
(1− δ)+δ ∫ v
0
β2 (t) dt]dv. The second-stage expected
sum of payment can be rearranged as
∫ 1
0
[β1 (v) β
−1
2 (β1 (v))+β2 (v) β
−1
1 (β2 (v))− vβ2 (v)]}dv.
So the total revenue is:
R3 = 2{
∫ 1
0
v2
2
(1− δ) dv+∫ 1
0
δ[
∫ v
0
β2 (t) dt+β1 (v) β
−1
2 (β1 (v))+β2 (v) β
−1
1 (β2 (v))−vβ2 (v)]dv}.
Let P =
∫ 1
0
[
∫ v
0
β2 (t) dt+ β1 (v) β
−1
2 (β1 (v)) + β2 (v) β
−1
1 (β2 (v))− vβ2 (v)]dv.
Since
∫ 1
0
∫ v
0
β2 (t) dtdv =
∫ 1
0
(1− v) β2 (v) dv, P can then be rewritten as:
P =
∫ 1
0
{β2 (v) + β1 (v)λ2 ((β1 (v)) + β2 (v)λ1(β2 (v))− 2vβ2 (v)}dv
B. We need to find a bound for P . As there is no closed form solution to the bid functions,
our approach is to use their bounds to bound P . We claim that P < 1− 5
3
t∗+t∗2− 1
3
t∗4+
1
3
t∗5
and t∗ >
5
8
, where t∗ is the common end point of two second-stage bid functions. To show
this, we will first obtain some auxiliary results. Here we abbreviate the terminal bid t∗ as t.
Result 1.∫ t
0
sλ2 (s)λ
′
2 (s) ds = sλ2 (s)λ2 (s) |t0 −
∫ t
0
λ2 (s) (λ2 (s) + sλ
′
2 (s)) ds
= t− ∫ t
0
λ2 (s)λ2 (s) ds−
∫ t
0
sλ2 (s)λ
′
2 (s) ds
So 2
∫ t
0
sλ2 (s)λ
′
2 (s) ds = t−
∫ t
0
[λ2 (s)]
2ds
Result 2.
Multiply s to both sides of equation (9) and integrate, we have∫ t
0
sλ1 (s)λ
′
2 (s) ds−
∫ t
0
s2λ′2 (s) ds =
∫ t
0
sλ2 (s) ds, which leads to:∫ t
0
sλ1 (s)λ
′
2 (s) ds− [s2λ2 (s) |t0 −
∫ t
0
2sλ2 (s) ds] =
∫ t
0
sλ2 (s) ds
So
∫ t
0
sλ1 (s)λ
′
2 (s) ds = t
2 − ∫ t
0
sλ2 (s) ds
Result 3.∫ t
0
λ2 (s)λ
′
1 (s) ds
= λ2 (s)λ1 (s) |t0 −
∫ t
0
λ′2 (s)λ1 (s) ds = 1−
∫ t
0
(λ2 (s) + sλ
′
2 (s)) ds
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= 1− [∫ t
0
λ2 (s) ds+
∫ t
0
sλ′2 (s) ds] = 1− [
∫ t
0
λ2 (s) ds+ sλ2 (s) |t0 −
∫ t
0
λ2 (s) ds] = 1− t
It is easy to see that
∫ t
0
λ1 (s)λ
′
2 (s) ds = t.
Result 4.
λ1 (s)λ
′
2 (s) + λ2 (s)λ
′
1 (s) = λ1 (s) + sλ
′
1 (s) + sλ
′
2 (s) by adding equation (6) and (7).
So
∫ t
0
[λ1 (s) + sλ
′
1 (s) + sλ
′
2 (s)]ds = 1∫ t
0
λ1 (s) ds+ sλ1 (s) |t0 −
∫ t
0
λ1 (s) ds+ sλ2 (s) |t0 −
∫ t
0
λ2 (s) ds = 1
Then
∫ t
0
λ2 (s) ds = 2t− 1
Result 5.∫ t
0
sλ′2 (s) ds = sλ2 (s) |t0 −
∫ t
0
λ2 (s) ds = t−
∫ t
0
λ2 (s) ds = 1− t.
Using the above results, we can find the new expression and the bound for P as follows.
I.
∫ 1
0
β2 (v) dv =
∫ t
0
sλ′2 (s) ds = 1− t. Then 1− t <
∫ 1
0
3
4
vdv because β2 (v) <
3
4
, leading to
t >
5
8
.
II.
∫ 1
0
β1 (v)λ2 ((β1 (v)) dv <
∫ 1
0
tv2dv =
t
3
because β1 (v) < tv and λ2 (β1 (v)) < v.
III.
∫ 1
0
[β2 (v)λ1(β2 (v))− 2vβ2 (v)]dv =
∫ t
0
sλ1 (s)λ
′
2 (s) ds−
∫ t
0
2sλ2 (s)λ
′
2 (s) ds
= t2 − ∫ t
0
sλ2 (s) ds− t+
∫ t
0
[λ2 (s)]
2ds < t2 − t+ ∫ t
0
ts (ts− s) ds = t2 − t+ 1
3
t5 − 1
3
t4
IV. Therefore, P < 1− t+ t
3
+ t2 − t+ 1
3
t5 − 1
3
t4
C. We are ready to find the final bound. P − ∫ 1
0
v2
2
dv <
5
6
− 5
3
t∗+ t∗2− 1
3
t∗4+
1
3
t∗5. The
expression on the right hand side of the inequality is monotonically decreasing for t∗ ∈ [1
2
,
3
4
]. Using the fact that t∗ >
5
8
, we obtain a upper bound of P − ∫ 1
0
v2
2
dv as
8
49
. Since
R3 =
1
3
+ 2δ(P − ∫ 1
0
v2
2
dv), we then have R3 <
1
3
+
16
49
δ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.
We need to show that the overall revenue has the following expression:
R4= 2× {
∫ 1
0
v2
2
(1 + δ) dv +δ[
∫ 1
2
0
(e2
∫ v
2
0
v2 − t2
t
e
−
v
t dt)dv +
∫ 1
1
2
(e2
∫ v
2
v− 1
2
v2 − t2
t
e
−
v
t dt)dv]}
Once this result can be obtained, we can immediately reach the conclusion that R4 >
1
3
+
1
3
δ
because
2×∫ 1
0
v2
2
(1 + δ) dv =
1
3
+
1
3
δ and
∫ 1
2
0
(e2
∫ v
2
0
v2 − t2
t
e
−
v
t dt)dv+
∫ 1
1
2
(e2
∫ v
2
v− 1
2
v2 − t2
t
e
−
v
t dt)dv >
0. Now we start to derive the expression of R4. At the valuation v, if bidder 1 loses the
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first stage and the winner’s valuation is inferred as vˆ, where vˆ is uniformly distributed
in (v, 1] with density
1
1− v , then she will bid β
vˆ
2 (v) = vˆ −
vˆ2
4v
. Her rival will random-
ize over (
vˆ
2
,
3vˆ
4
] with c.d.f. Gv (b) =
vˆ
2 (2b− vˆ)e
4b− 3vˆ
2b− vˆ . If v > 1
2
, the probability for
bidder 1 to win the second stage is Pr(vˆ − vˆ
2
4v
> b) = Gv(vˆ − vˆ
2
4v
) =
v
2v − vˆ e
2v − 2vˆ
2v − vˆ .
Her expected payment is
∫ 1
v
4vvˆ − vˆ2
4(2v − vˆ)e
2v − 2vˆ
2v − vˆ ( 1
1− v )dvˆ. Similarly if v ≤
1
2
, her expected
payment is
∫ 2v
v
4vvˆ − vˆ2
4(2v − vˆ)e
2v − 2vˆ
2v − vˆ ( 1
1− v )dvˆ. Next consider the case where bidder 1 wins
the first stage at the valuation v. Then her rival will have valuation vˆ distributed over
the support [0, v) with density
1
v
. The probability for bidder 1 to win the second stage is
Pr(b > v − v
2
4vˆ
) = Pr(vˆ <
v2
4 (v − b)) =
v
4 (v − b) . So the expected payment for bidder 1
following her winning the first stage is:∫ 3v
4
v
2
b× v
4 (v − b)d(
v
2 (2b− v)e
4b− 3v
2b− v ). We use Tv> 1
2
and Tv< 1
2
to denote the overall expected
payments for bidder 1 at the second stage when v >
1
2
and v <
1
2
respectively. Then we
have:
Tv> 1
2
= v
∫ 3v
4
v
2
b× v
4 (v − b)d(
v
2 (2b− v)e
4b− 3v
2b− v ) + (1− v) ∫ 1
v
4vvˆ − vˆ2
4(2v − vˆ)e
2v − 2vˆ
2v − vˆ ( 1
1− v )dvˆ
= v
∫ 3v
4
v
2
b× v
4 (v − b)d(
v
2 (2b− v)e
4b− 3v
2b− v ) + ∫ 1
v
4vvˆ − vˆ2
4(2v − vˆ)e
2v − 2vˆ
2v − vˆ dvˆ
Tv> 1
2
can be rearranged as:
Tv> 1
2
=
e2
8
v3
∫ v
2
0
v + t
t3
e
−
v
t dt+ e2
∫ v
2
v− 1
2
v2 − t2
t
e
−
v
t dt
=
e2
8
v3[
∫ v
2
0
v
t3
e
−
v
t dt+
∫ v
2
0
1
t2
e
−
v
t dt] + e2
∫ v
2
v− 1
2
v2 − t2
t
e
−
v
t dt
Notice that
∫ v
2
0
v
t3
e
−
v
t dt= −1
v
∫ v
2
0
−v
t
e
−
v
t d(−v
t
) = −1
v
(−v
t
e
−
v
t−e−
v
t )|
v
2
0=
3
v
e−2 and
∫ v
2
0
1
t2
e
−
v
t dt =
1
v
∫ v
2
0
e
−
v
t d(−v
t
) =
1
v
(e
−
v
t )|
v
2
0 =
1
v
e−2. Therefore, Tv> 1
2
=
v2
2
+ e2
∫ v
2
v− 1
2
v2 − t2
t
e
−
v
t dt. With
similar method, we can find Tv≤ 1
2
as follows.
Tv≤ 1
2
= v
∫ 3v
4
v
2
b× v
4 (v − b)d(
v
2 (2b− v)e
4b− 3v
2b− v ) + (1− v) ∫ 2v
v
4vvˆ − vˆ2
4(2v − vˆ)e
2v − 2vˆ
2v − vˆ ( 1
1− v )dvˆ
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=
v2
2
+ e2
∫ v
2
0
v2 − t2
t
e
−
v
t dt
To sum up, the expected payment T for bidder 1 at the second stage is:
T =
v2
2
+ e2
∫ v
2
0
v2 − t2
t
e
−
v
t dt when v ≤ 1
2
=
v2
2
+ e2
∫ v
2
v− 1
2
v2 − t2
t
e
−
v
t dt when v >
1
2
Then it is straight forward to obtain the desired expression for R4. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.
The expected payment for a bidder with valuation v at the second stage is: Q2 =
v
∫ v
0
[(1− k) t + kv]1
v
dt =
1
2
v2 (1 + k). The expected payment for a bidder with valuation
v at the first stage is: Q1 = v[
(1− δk)v
2
] =
(1− δk)v2
2
. So R5 = 2 ×
∫ 1
0
(Q1 + δQ2)dv =
2× ∫ 1
0
(
(1− δk)v2
2
+
1
2
δv2 (1 + k))dv =
1
3
+
1
3
δ. Q.E.D.
Proofs for Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let bidder 1 be the generic bidder for our derivation of the equilibrium bid functions.
Since bidders’ signals are cross-period independent, while Θ1 is correlated with Θ2, the only
valuable information the bidders will condition on is the inferred true value of θ1. Then the
second-stage bid function will take the form of β2 (x
1
2, θ1), where the first-stage information
p1, x
1
1, x
2
1, ...x
N
1 affects the bid only through the aggregated variable θ1.
Let v12 (x
1
2, y
1
2, θ1) = E[P2|X12 = x12, Y 12 = y12,Θ1 = θ1], where Y 12 = max
s 6=1
Xs2 and y
1
2 is
its realized value. The c.d.f. of Y 12 is F
N−1 (.) and the p.d.f of Y 12 is (N − 1)FN−2 (.) f (.) .
Then
E[P2|X12 = x12, Y 12 = y12,Θ1 = θ1]
= E[αΘ2 + (1− α)U(X12 , X22 , ...XN2 )|X12 = x12, Y 12 = y12,Θ1 = θ1]
= αθ1 + (1− α)E[U(x12, X2t , ...XNt )|Y i2 = y12]
Let us assume bidder 1 mimics type z at the second stage given her true signal is x12 .
Then her second-stage payoff is:
Π2 (z, x
1
2, θ1) =
∫ z
0
[v12 (x
1
2, y
1
2, θ1)− β2 (z, θ1)] (N − 1)FN−2 (y12) f (y12) dy12
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The first-order condition w.r.t. z leads to:
(1) [v12 (x
1
2, z, θ1)− β2 (z, θ1)] (N − 1)FN−2 (z) f (z)− β′2 (z, θ1)FN−1 (z) = 0
The equilibrium condition z = x12 leads to:
(2) [v12 (x
1
2, x
1
2, θ1)− β2 (x12, θ1)] (N − 1) f (x12)− β′2 (x12, θ1)F (x12) = 0.
The solution to equation (2) is standard, which gives:
β2 (x
1
2, θ1)
=
1
FN−1 (x12)
∫ x12
0
v12 (y, y, θ1) dF
N−1 (y)
= E (v12 (Y
1
2 , Y
1
2 , θ1) |Y 12 < x12)
= αθ1 + (1− α)E{E[U(Y 12 , X2t , ...XNt )|Y 12 ]|Y 12 < x12}
We can obtain the final equilibrium bid function by replacing θ1 with
p1
α
−(1− α)U(x
1
1, x
2
1, ...x
N
1 )
α
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let us assume all bidders follow the monotonic bid functions β1 (.) and β2 (.) truthfully
except bidder 1. At the signal x11, let us assume bidder 1 mimics z 6= x11 at the first stage. Let
v11 (x
1
1, y
1
1) = E[P1|X11 = x11, Y 11 = y11], where Y 11 = max
s 6=1
Xs1 and y
1
1 is its realized value. Then
her first-stage payoff is: Π1 (x
1
1, z) =
∫ z
0
(v11 (x
1
1, y
1
1)− β1 (z)) (N − 1)FN−2 (y12) f (y12) dy11
At the second stage, all other bidders will follow β2
(
xi2, θˆ1
)
, where i 6= 1. Notice that the
true θ1 =
p1
α
− ( 1
α
−1)U(x11, x21, ...xN1 ), where θ1 is increasing in p1 and decreasing in all other
arguments. But bidder 1 mimics type z, so all other bidder will be induced to believe that the
realized fundamental is θˆ1 =
p1
α
− ( 1
α
− 1)U(z, x21, ...xN1 ) 6= θ1. Therefore, bidder 1’s second-
stage payoff is: Π2
(
x12, τ, θ1, θˆ1
)
=
∫ τ
0
[v12 (x
1
2, y
1
2, θ1)− β2(τ, θˆ1)] (N − 1)FN−2 (y12) f (y12) dy12
Notice that we let bidder 1 bid according to β2(., θˆ1) rather than β2(., θ1) even though
she knows the true value θ1. This is because it is never optimal for bidder 1 to bid outside
the support of β2(., θˆ1), according to which all her rivals bid. Then Bidder 1’s decision is
simply to choose a bid within this particular support, which corresponds to a certain type
τ ∈ [0, ω]. So τ ∗ = argmax
τ
Π2
(
x12, τ, θ1, θˆ1
)
. The FOC w.r.t. τ leads to:
(3) [v12 (x
1
2, τ, θ1)− β2
(
τ, θˆ1
)
] (N − 1) f (τ)− β′2
(
τ, θˆ1
)
F (τ) = 0
Let v12 (y, y, θ1) (N − 1)FN−2 (y) f (y) = V (y, θ1). Then β2 (x12, θ1) =
1
FN−1 (x12)
∫ x12
0
V (y, θ1) dy.
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So β′2 (x
1
2, θ1) =
V (x12, θ1)
FN−1 (x12)
− (N − 1) f (x
1
2) β2 (x
1
2, θ1)
F (x12)
. Substituting the functional form of
β′2 (x
1
2, θ1) into the above equation (3), we have:
(4) v12 (x
1
2, τ, θ1) = v
1
2
(
τ, τ, θˆ1
)
Equation (4) can be transformed into:
(5) αθ1 +
1− α
FN−1 (τ)
∫ τ
0
...
∫ τ
0
U
(
x12, x
2
2...x
N
2
)
f (x22) ...f
(
xN2
)
dx22...dx
N
2
= αθˆ1 +
1− α
FN−1 (τ)
∫ τ
0
...
∫ τ
0
U
(
τ, x22...x
N
2
)
f (x22) ...f
(
xN2
)
dx22...dx
N
2
Equation (5) can be reduced to:
(6) −U(x11, x21, ...xN1 ) +
1
FN−1 (τ)
∫ τ
0
...
∫ τ
0
U
(
x12, x
2
2...x
N
2
)
f (x22) ...f
(
xN2
)
dx22...dx
N
2
= −U(z, x21, ...xN1 ) +
1
FN−1 (τ)
∫ τ
0
...
∫ τ
0
U
(
τ, x22...x
N
2
)
f (x22) ...f
(
xN2
)
dx22...dx
N
2
Given that U (.) is both monotonic and symmetric in each of its components, we can
obtain that for any z together with the set of realized signals {x12, x11, x21, ...xN1 }, there is a
unique optimal τ ∗
(
x12, z, x
1
1, x
2
1, ...x
N
1
)
that corresponds to z. Also, τ ∗
(
x12, z, x
1
1, x
2
1, ...x
N
1
)
is
monotonic in x11.When z → x11, τ ∗ → x12, so τ ∗ will not be a corner solution over the support
[0, ω] with probability 1.
The overall two-stage payoff is: Π = Π1 + δEX21 ,...,xN1 ,Θ1,X12Π2. Π1 is bidder 1’s first-stage
payoff given she mimics type z. Π2 is her optimal second-stage payoff by mimicking type
τ ∗
(
x12, z, x
1
1, x
2
1, ...x
N
1
)
after processing all the interperiod information. Then the FOC. w.r.t.
z is:
(7)
∂Π1
∂z
+ δ
dEX21 ,...,xN1 ,Θ1,X12Π
∗
2
dz
= 0
It is easy to see that
∂Π1
∂z
= [v11 (x
1
1, z)−β1 (z)] (N − 1)FN−2 (z) f (z)−β′1 (z)FN−1 (z) and
dEX21 ,...,xN1 ,Θ1,X12Π2
dz
= EX21 ,...,xN1 ,Θ1,X12 (
dΠ2
dz
). Using the envelope theorem without constraint
(since we argue before that the optimal τ ∗ will not be a corner solution with probability 1),
we have:
dΠ2
dz
=
∫ τ∗
0
−∂β2(τ
∗, θˆ1)
∂θˆ1
∂θˆ1
∂z
(N − 1)FN−2 (y12) f (y12) dy12
= (1− α)∂U(z, x
2
1, ...x
N
1 )
∂z
FN−1
(
τ ∗
(
x12, z, x
1
1, x
2
1, ...x
N
1
))
So
dΠ2
dz
> 0 and EX21 ,...,xN1 ,Θ1,X12 (
dΠ2
dz
) > 0. Let EX21 ,...,xN1 ,Θ1,X12 (
dΠ2
dz
) = H (z, x11). Then we
have
H (x11, x
1
1) = EX21 ,...,xN1 ,Θ1,X12 (
dΠ2
dz
)|z=x11
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= (1− α)EX12{EX21 ,...,xN1 [
∂U(z, x21, ...x
N
1 )
∂z
FN−1
(
τ ∗
(
x12, z, x
1
1, x
2
1, ...x
N
1
))
]}|z=x11
From the above derivation, we know that τ ∗
(
x12, z, x
1
1, x
2
1, ...x
N
1
) |z=x11 = x12, H (x11, x11) can
thus be further simplified as:
H (x11, x
1
1)
= (1− α)EX12{EX21 ,...,xN1 [
∂U(z, x21, ...x
N
1 )
∂z
FN−1 (x12)]}
= (1− α)EX21 ,...,xN1 [
∂U(z, x21, ...x
N
1 )
∂z
EX12F
N−1 (x12)]
=
1− α
N
EX21 ,...,xN1 [
∂U(x11, x
2
1, ...x
N
1 )
∂z
]
=
1− α
N
[
∂EX21 ,...,xN1 [U(x
1
1, x
2
1, ...x
N
1 )]
∂x11
]
In equilibrium, we need z = x11, so the FOC of equation (7) becomes:
(8) [v11 (x
1
1, x
1
1)− β1 (x11)] (N − 1)FN−2 (x11) f (x11)− β′1 (x11)FN−1 (x11) +δH (x11, x11) = 0
Equation (8) can be rearranged as
(9) [(v11 (x
1
1, x
1
1) +
δH (x11, x
1
1)
(N − 1)FN−2 (x11) f (x11)
)− β1 (x11)] (N − 1) f (x11)− β′1 (x11)F (x11) = 0
Let Vˆ (y11, y
1
1) = [v
1
1 (y
1
1, y
1
1) +
δH (y11, y
1
1)
(N − 1)FN−2 (y11) f (y11)
]. Then β1 (x
1
1) = E[Vˆ (Y
1
1 , Y
1
1 ) |Y 11 <
x11].
Replacing v11 (y
1
1, y
1
1) with αEΘ1+(1− α)E[U(Y 11 , X−11 )|Y 11 = y11], we can obtain the desired
expression. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
The monotonicity of
[EX−i1 U(X
i
1, X
−i
1 )]
′
[FN−1 (X i1)]′
ensures the monotonicity of the derived first-
stage bid function. Now we will check whether the bid functions derived in Proposition 1 and
2 indeed constitute an equilibrium. We need to show that given all other bidders follow these
monotonic bid functions, bidder 1 has no incentive to mimic a false type. Let us assume bid-
der 1 observe a type y while decide to mimic type z in the first stage and let her total expected
payoff (the first-stage payoff plus the expected second-stage optimal continuation payoff) be
Π. Then
dΠ
dz
= [v11 (y, z)−β1 (z)] (N − 1)FN−2 (z) f (z)−β′1 (z)FN−1 (z)+ δH (z, y) accord-
ing to equation (7) in the proof of Proposition 2. The right-hand side of the above equation
can be rearranged as (N − 1)FN−2 (z) f (z) [v11 (y, z) +
δH (z, y)
(N − 1)FN−2 (z) f (z) − β1 (z)] −
β′1 (z)F
N−1 (z). We next need to show that the term v11 (y, z) +
δH (z, y)
(N − 1)FN−2 (z) f (z) is
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monotonic in y. Since both v11 (y, z) and H (z, y) are monotonic in y as we can see from the
proof of Proposition 2, the whole term is monotonic in y too. Then using equation (8) in the
proof of Proposition 2, it is easy to show that setting z < y makes
dΠ
dz
> 0 and z > y makes
dΠ
dz
< 0. So Π is maximized by choosing z = y. The off-equilibrium path belief also elimi-
nates a bidder’s incentive to bid above β1 (ω) in the first stage because she will be inferred
as zero type, which always makes her rivals bid more aggressively at the second stage hence
lowering the bidder’s overall payoff. Given that bidders bid truthfully in the first stage, the
second-stage problem is a standard common-value auction with public information, whose
equilibrium check is standard hence omitted.
A comparison of each stage’s bid function shows that for the same signal, the first-stage
bid function is bigger than the second-stage one by the term
δ (1− α)
N
EY i1 {
δ[EX−i1 U(Y
i
1 , X
−i
1 )]
′
[FN−1 (Y i1 )]′
|Y i1 < xi1}. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.
We will first consider the finite N-stage case. Again, we let bidder 1 be our generic
bidder and assume a symmetric monotonic equilibrium exists. Then in equilibrium, i.e.,
given truthful bidding, we must have EβN−1 (.) > EβN (.) (N is the last stage) from
our proof for the two-stage problem. Now at period t + 1, where t ∈ {1, 2, ...N − 1}, if
bidder 1 observes a signal x1t+1 and mimics a type z, given all other bidders follow the
equilibrium strategy, she can obtain a best continuation payoff c(x1t+1, z, pt, x
−1
t ). Let
v1t (x
1
t , y
1
t , θt−1) = E[Pt|X1t = x1t , Y 1t = y1t ,Θt−1 = θt−1], where Y 1t = max
s6=1
Xst and y
1
t is
its realized value. Then bidder 1’s stage payoff of period t+ 1 is:
Πt+1
(
z, x1t+1, θt
)
=
∫ z
0
[v1t+1
(
x1t+1, y
1
t+1, θt
)− βt+1 (z, θt)] (N − 1)FN−2 (y1t+1) f (y1t+1) dy1t+1
At period t, if bidder 1 observes a signal x1t and mimics a type γ, given all other bidders
follow the equilibrium strategy, she will mimic a type z at period t+1 given signal x1t+1 and
obtain a best continuation payoff c(x1t+1, z, pt, x
−1
t ).
1 Bidder 1’s stage payoff of period t is:
Πt (γ, x
1
t , θt−1) =
∫ γ
0
[v1t (x
1
t , y
1
t , θt−1)− βt (γ, θt−1)] (N − 1)FN−2 (y1t ) f (y1t ) dy1t
Given bidder 1 mimics γ at period t, her rivals’ inference of θˆt will be
pt
α
− ( 1
α
− 1)U(γ, x−1t )
1Note: the continuation payoff from period t+1 remains the same no matter there is mimicking in period
t or not because the inference of z at period t+ 1 will not be affected.
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and her stage payoff of period t+ 1 will become:
Πt+1
(
z, x1t+1, θt, θˆt
)
=
∫ z
0
[v1t+1
(
x1t+1, y
1
t+1, θt
)−βt+1 (z, θˆt)] (N − 1)FN−2 (y1t+1) f (y1t+1) dy1t+1
Then bidder 1’s total payoff starting from period t on is:∫ γ
0
[v1t (x
1
t , y
1
t , θt−1)− βt (γ, θt−1)] (N − 1)FN−2 (y1t ) f (y1t ) dy1t
+δE,X1t+1,X
−1
t ,Pt
∫ z
0
[v1t+1
(
x1t+1, y
1
t+1, θt
)− βt+1 (z, θˆt)] (N − 1)FN−2 (y1t+1) f (y1t+1) dy1t+1
+δ2EX1t+1,X
−1
t ,Pt
c(x1t+1, z, pt, x
−1
t )
Then the FOC w.r.t. γ leads to:
(10) [v1t (x
1
t , γ, θt−1)− βt (γ, θt−1)] (N − 1)FN−2 (γ) f (γ)− β′t (γ, θt−1)FN−1 (γ)
−δEX1t+1,X−1t ,Pt [
∂βt+1(z, θˆt)
∂θˆt
∂θˆt
∂γ
(N − 1)FN−2 (y1t+1) f (y1t+1) dy1t+1]|z∗ = 0
Equation (10) is a necessary condition for any equilibrium. Setting γ = x1t , then the optimal
z∗ must equal x1t+1 as in the proof of Proposition 2. So equation (10) can be transformed to:
(11) [v1t (x
1
t , x
1
t , θt−1)− βt (x1t , θt−1)] (N − 1)FN−2 (x1t ) f (x1t )− β′t (x1t , θt−1)FN−1 (x1t )
+δEX1t+1,X
−1
t ,Θt
[
∂βt+1(z, θˆt)
∂θˆt
(
1
α
− 1)∂U(x
1
t , x
−1
t )
∂x1t
FN−1
(
x1t+1
)
] = 0
In the finite N-stage case, βN(x
1
N , θN−1) can be obtained in the same way as in the proof
of Proposition 1, where θN−1 is linearly separable with coefficient α from all other parts of
the expression of the bid function. So
∂βN(x
1
N , θˆN−1)
∂θˆN−1
equals the constant α. Similarly, from
equation (11) we can show that
∂βt(x
1
t , θˆt−1)
∂θˆt−1
= α for all t < N with backward induction.
This leads to the conclusion that E βt(.) will be the same for all period t except the last one
since the last stage does not have a continuation payoff anymore.
We then consider the infinite-stage case. We assume there exists a stationary symmetric
monotonic equilibrium, then the payoff from period t on under valuation x1t with mimicking
type γ equals:∫ γ
0
[v1t (x
1
t , y
1
t , θt−1)−βt (γ, θt−1)] (N − 1)FN−2 (y1t ) f (y1t ) dy1t +δEX1t+1,X−1t ,Ptc(x1t+1, γ, pt, x
−1
t ).
Since the equilibrium is assumed to be stationary, the functional form of the expected contin-
uation payoff EX1t+1,X
−1
t ,Pt
c(x1t+1, z, pt, x
−1
t ) will be the same for any period t. Then standard
FOC w.r.t. γ plus setting γ to x1t method gives us a constant price path. Q.E.D.
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